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Employment: A Case Study on Sierra Leone. 
Rashida Strober 
ABSTRACT 
Since their inception in African countries, structural 
adjustment has tended to cause more harm than help. This thesis aims to 
answer the question, in what ways have structural adjustment policies impacted 
Africa in general and Sierra Leone in particular? This question is highly relevant 
when it is considered that Africa is on of the poorest regions in the world and has 
experiences much conflict and suffering. In addition, much is known about the 
impact of structural adjustment in many African countries. However, little has 
been written on the impact of structural adjustment in Sierra Leone, especially in 
terms of the impact of structural adjustment on conflict. The hypothesis of this 
thesis is that the impact of structural adjustment policies has tended to increase 
poverty. Poverty has led to frustration and conflict in Africa in general and Sierra 
Leone in particular. In order to substantiate this hypothesis I have elected to 
focus on the years between 1960 and the late 1980s. The finding contained 
within this thesis show that structural adjustment policies may have led to a 
reduction of social services that include health, education and unemployment. 
v 
ORGANIZATION OF TEXT 
This thesis focuses on the impact of structural adjustment policies on Sierra 
Leone. In order to set the stage for the discussion, in the first chapter, I introduce a 
brief overview of the topic. I then review the literature in regards to structural 
adjustment's broader impact on African countries. In looking at the broader impact of 
structural adjustment on African countries, I discuss the origins of Africa's economic 
decline that prompted its countries to seek the assistance of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. I also focus on the nature of structural adjustment 
policies in terms of its theoretical foundations. In doing so, I discuss the impact that 
such policies have had on African countries. 
In the second chapter, I discuss the conditions under which Sierra Leone 
obtained loans with conditionalities attached to them known as structural adjustment 
policies. In chapter three, I discuss the impact that structural adjustment may have 
had on the delivery of social services that include health, education and employment. 
In the final chapter, I discuss the possibility that structural adjustment policies 
may have had an impact on the civil war (1991-2000) in Sierra Leone. I discuss how 
the government's failure to deliver basic and services led to frustration that may have 
been a factor that led to the civil war. 
vi 
METHODOLOGY 
I have elected to use the case study method for this thesis. This research has 
been conducted using a number of sources. I analyze the running record that 
includes journals, books and internet retrieved articles as they pertain to the topic 
under discussion. I utilize these sources to analyze structural adjustment policies as 
they pertain to African countries in general and Sierra Leone in particular. I have also 
obtained empirical data from primary sources. 
The chief methodological weakness is that I chiefly relied on the running record 
which consists of secondary sources, in order to conduct this research. This method 
has its limitations. The limitations include; a lack of first hand empirical knowledge in 
terms of access to data. The primary factors that have prevented me from conducting 
research using primary sources are financial, geographical and time constraints. 
vii 
Chapter One 
Introduction and Literature Review: 
The Origins of Economic Decline in African Countries and the Need for SAPs 
The incorporation of the Third World in general and Africa in particular into 
the global capitalist economy has not been an easy task. The argument can be 
made that the transition has contributed to many of Africa's socio-economic 
problems that persist presently. Some of these problems include economic 
decline, civil wars, poverty, unemployment, low GDP per capita, high illiteracy 
rates and government instability. 
The literature reveals that many scholars believe that the economic 
decline of African nations that prompted them to seek the assistance of the 
international community was due to endogenous and exogenous factors arising 
after independence (Adepoju, 1993, Stewart, 1995;, Easterly, 2001, Geo-Jaja 
and Magnum, 2001 ;, Napier, 2002;, Zack-Williams, 1990;, Wallace, 1999 ). In the 
majority of African countries growth in the early years of independence gave way 
to stagnation and decline (Adepoju, 1993). With this in mind there are relevant 
questions that need to be answered. First, what were the origins of Africa's 
economic decline? Secondly, how did the economic problems that led Africa to 
seek the assistance of the international community evolve? 
In order to answer the latter questions it is of importance to take a brief 
look at two periods. The first period is the condition of the African economies 
during the first decade of independence. Adepoju (1993) advocates that 
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understanding this period is of importance to understanding why Africa in general 
and Sierra Leone in particular needed the economic assistance of the 
international community. In the next section I focus on the state of African 
economies during the first decade of independence. 
The African Economy During the First Decade of Independence 
Most African countries gained independence during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s (Adepoju, 1993;, Myers, 1987;, Weeks, 1992). The scholarly 
consensus regarding the economic performance of African countries at the 
outset of independence is that African economies were experiencing economic 
growth. For example, Adepoju (1993) cites that countries such as Kenya, 
Zambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Malawi were experiencing growth. Between 
1964 and 1969 real gross domestic product grew by 6.5 per cent in Kenya. In 
Zambia real growth grew by 15 per cent for the years between 1964 and 1969 
and per capita income increased by an annual average of 13 per cent. Inflation 
was moderate in many African economies (Adepoju, 1993). For example, in 
Malawi the inflation rate was at 6.5 percent between 1964 and 1969 and in 
Kenya the rate was 3.4 per cent between 1965 and 1975. 
Weeks (1992) further notes that the majority of African countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa had from the time of independence until the oil shocks of 1973-
197 4 maintained growth rates that were above the rate of population increases. 
He further states that for all Sub-Saharan African countries, per capita income 
grew at almost 3 per cent. Additionally, in 1967 the consumption of the state was 
at 15 per cent and often below 1 O per cent for Africa as a whole. 
Berg and Whitaker (1986) posit that the hope and optimism of the 1960s 
waned into unease and economic decline in the preceding decades of the 1970s 
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and 80s. With these perspectives in mind it is of importance to ask the question 
what caused the economic stagnation and eventual decline that resulted in the 
decades following independence? In the next section I aim to shed light on this 
highly important question. 
The State of African Economies: the 1970s and 1980s 
During the mid to late 1970s and early 1980s most African economies 
went into economic decline and the decline was prevalent within virtually all 
economic sectors (Adepoju, 1993,; United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2000). The 1973 oil increases on the world market coupled with 
the subsequent slowdown of growth in the developing world had adverse impacts 
on African countries (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
2000). 
Between 1973 and 1980 many African countries experienced severe 
decline (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2000). Many 
countries were affected. For example, Zambia's Gross Domestic Product was 
stagnant between 1970 and 1985 as the population increased at 3 percent 
(Adepoju, 1993). The real growth rate in Kenya dropped from 6.5 percent down 
to 4 per cent in 1975 while Sierra Leone's real growth rate dropped from 2 per 
cent a year between the years of 1975-1980, to zero from 1983 to 1987 
(Adepoju , 1993). In the case of Ghana, food production dropped by 72 percent by 
1983 and in Malawi exports fell by 40 per cent while imports increased resulting 
in a deterioration of the terms of trade by 30 per cent (Adepoju, 1993). The 
inflation rate of Kenya increased from 3.4 per cent prior to 1974 to 11 per cent 
from 1975 to 1984 (Adepoju, 1993). According to Sahn, Dorosh and Younger 
(1997) gross domestic product per capita grew by less than 1 percent from 1979 
to 1992 in all African countries. 
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Export savings and investments have also declined in African countries. 
Between 1975 and 1990 Africa's share of the developing world's international 
exports dropped off by more than one-half (Sahn, et al, 1997). In the years that 
followed debt increased while debt servicing exports hardly kept up. Myers 
(1987) notes that by the late 1970s much of Africa as a result of deteriorating 
economic conditions, had become burdened with debt of which it was not able to 
service. For example, in the 1980s Nigeria's foreign debt reached $30 billion 
despite its oil revenues (Bevan, Gemmell, Greenway, 2000). Another example 
of extreme debt problems is the fact that in 1978 Africa's total external debt was 
at $72.4 billion (Stewart, 2000). 
By the 1980s the debt problem had become an obstacle for many African 
countries. Hanlon's (2000) view is that Africa should have then and should at the 
present be granted debt relief. The basic argument that he presents in the 
article, "How Much Debt Must Be Canceled?" is that since debt crisis and debt 
cancellation are a normal cycle in the economies of all countries, the 
unwillingness to cancel debt is unusual to the cycle. Within his estimation one of 
the best things that the World Bank and the IMF could do to contribute to 
alleviating Africa's economic problems is to allow for debt cancellation. 
Similarly, Cheru (2000) shares the notion that the debt burden must be 
cancelled. He notes that without debt cancellation, African countries have little 
hope of treating their 25 million AIDS victims and caring for their nearly 13 million 
orphans with AIDS. For Cheru, debt cancellation is an issue of survival. 
The scholarly consensus is that there was drastic and severe economic 
decline in African countries after the first decade of independence that caused it 
to become dependant upon the external assistance of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
The question remains, how was it possible for African economies to 
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experience a decade of growth between 1960 and 1970 and then fall into severe 
decline after this first decade of independence? The origin of Africa's economic 
crisis is clearly an issue that is a matter of debate within the literature. The World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund were not shy about assigning the 
major causes in the decline of African economies to Africa's own internal woes. 
A quote taken from a World Bank report is worth noting to illustrate the latter 
point: 
''Although many African countries have seen their development efforts 
disrupted by sharp falls in the world price of key commodities, viewed over the 
long term, falling per capita incomes for Africa as a whole since the . late 1970s 
are explained largely by the declining level and efficiency of investment 
compounded by accelerating population growth and not primarily by external 
factors" (Weeks, 1992). 
The World Bank had in essence determined that the problems contributing 
to Africa's economic decline stemmed primarily from internal factors. Internal 
factors include; governmental mismanagement, heavy borrowing during the late 
1970s and huge budgetary deficits (Stewart, 2000). Stewart (2000) notes that 
these factors were all under the responsibility of African governments prior to the 
era of adjustment and that the Bank/ Fund should not be held responsible. 
Weeks (1992) argues that Sierra Leone is a country that was an exception 
to severe internal mismanagement. He posits that the decline of the Sierra 
Leonean economy was not so much due to bad policy as was the shocks that it 
experienced from the international economic community and the early advice 
given to the government by the World Bank. However, I shall return to this topic 
in the chapter that discusses the specific economic problems in Sierra Leone. 
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Obasanjo and D'Orville (1991) take a more neutral position as they 
proclaim that the causes of the economic crisis is both internal (political, military, 
bureaucratic) and external (unfavorable terms of trade, debt burden). 
Adepoju (1993) identifies adverse weather conditions as a factor that has 
contributed to the economic decline of African countries. For example the author 
notes the droughts in Cameroon (1982-1983), Kenya (1974-1975, 1979-1980, 
1983:.1984) and Ghana (1978-1979, 1982-1983) as contributing to economic 
decline within these countries. Adepoju (1993) also cites the oil crisis of 1973-
1974 and 1979-1980 and the resulting collapse and economic recession that 
subsequently occurred in 1981. In addition, Adepoju (1993) believes that the 
most significant reasons for Africa's economic decline were increased 
protectionism by the developed countries, high external interest rates, declines in 
the inflow of capital, and the deterioration in the terms of trade. 
According to Weeks (1992) the fact that Sub-Saharan African countries 
were the least developed of the developing countries was not new. However, 
what was new was the extent of the decline of African countries as compared 
with other developing countries in addition to the fact that decline was 
accompanied by a more hostile international environment. 
Again, although much debate is prevalent, the general consensus within 
the literature is that Africa's economic woes were caused by both external and 
internal factors: 
Structural Adjustment Policies in Africa 
The debate in regards to the impact of structural adjustment policies in 
African countries has been highly charged. The opinions espoused by many 
noted scholars in the literature indicates that Bank/Fund policies as implemented 
through structural adjustment programs have tended to have an adverse impact 
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on African development (Stewart, 1995;, Chossudousky, 1997;, Naiman and 
Watkins, 1999;, Olukoshi, 2000;, Hanlon, 2000;, Geo-Jaja and Magnum, 2001 ;, 
Easterly, 2001 ;, Napier, 2001 ;, Cheru, 2002). During post- independence, Africa 
along with the rest of the developing world experienced a period of economic 
decline. This was due to both external and internal conditions. As Africa faced 
economic decline, the continent turned to the international community for 
assistance. More specifically Africa turned to the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
The implementation of structural adjustment policies in the Third World in 
general and in Africa in particular began during the 1980s as a remedy to 
economic decline and stagnation. During the decade of the 1980s African 
governments received numerous loans on the condition that governments 
implement Bank/Fund economic policies. The well known policies of structural 
adjustment embody the nature of these policies. The goal of structural 
adjustment policies was to stimulate and stabilize the declining economies of 
African countries. However, as noted above, many scholars and researchers 
have viewed these policies as adverse and ineffectual in part because they have 
failed to take into consideration the unique circumstances of the poor and may 
have contributed to increased poverty. 
Some scholars and researchers such as Demery and Squire (1996) and 
the World Bank Publication, Can Africa Claim the 2151 Century (2000), 
acknowledge that while adjustment policies have had some adverse impacts on 
poverty reduction, they also contend that upon the effective implementation of 
adjustment policies, growth did in fact take place in some African countries. For 
example, Demery and Squire (1996) along with the World Bank Publication 
(2000) view the countries of Ghana and Uganda as successful adjustment 
models. 
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Muuka (1998) in the article entitled, "In Defense of The World Bank and 
the IMF Conditionality in Structural Adjustment Programs," goes further as he 
poses what he terms the "counterfactual argument". Essentially, he asserts that 
without the implementation of structural adjustment policies, social costs could 
have possibly been much higher. Yet still scholars such as Stewart (1995) and 
Naiman and Watkins (2000) contest the effectiveness of the outcomes in growth 
and poverty reduction within positive adjustment models such as Ghana and 
Uganda. 
For better or worse, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
saw as the solution to Africa's economic woes the application of neo-classical 
economic policies as embodied within structural adjustment programs. The 
following sections are devoted to explaining why the IMF and the World Bank felt 
it necessary to implement structural adjustment as a corrective to declining and 
stagnate African economies. In order to understand why the Bank/Fund chose to 
implement structural adjustment it is necessary to understand the theoretical 
foundation upon which the IMF and World Bank stands. 
The Neo-Classical Theoretical Underpinnings of the IMF and the World Bank 
The ideological stance of the Bank/ Fund has been formed from western 
ideals of free market, liberalization and free enterprise (Kenen, 1986;, Meier, 
1982;, David, 1985). According to Napier (2001), the basic components of 
structural adjustment policies have their origins dating back several centuries. 
However, principals contained within 21st century structural adjustment 
programs stem from the ideas and views of Adam Smith and David Ricardo of 
the late 18th and early 19th centuries (Napier, 2001 ). Their ideas revolved around 
the following. First, that each consumer seeks to maximize his index preference 
and that each producer seeks techniques of production likely to create surpluses 
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of value in each market that might be an exchange between two agents (Napier, 
2001 ). This process may also involve many participants and prices that are fixed 
at a level such that each participant sees his situation improved and derives a 
surplus (Napier, 2001 ). In addition, real surpluses should be attributed to those 
who realize them or what may be referred to as the private appropriation of 
surpluses (Napier, 2001 ). 
Additionally, Rapley (2003) argues that neo-classical theory is concerned 
with the reduction of the government's role in the market economy. He further 
gives a more detailed description of the origins of neo-classical theory in addition 
to its basic premises. Rapley's ideas are as follows: Nao-classical theory is 
preceded by classical and modern liberalism. Classical liberalism involved ideals 
consistent with individualism. This notion involves the belief that human beings 
can advance when the government exercises limited control over their pursuits 
(Rapley, 2003). 
However, modern liberalism as espoused in the 191h century conveyed the 
idea that government should intervene in the affairs of the market due to the 
many inherent inequalities in society (Rapley, 2003). In short, modern liberalism 
conveyed that it is the government's responsibility to level the playing field 
(Rapley, 2003). 
Beginning in the 1960s, a shift within the ideals of modern liberalism 
began to take place in the advanced countries (Rapley, 2003). Modern liberalism 
went through a renaissance period wherein the ideas of classical liberalism were 
revived (Rapley, 2003). Neo-classical theory held that the most economically 
viable economy is one in which the individual is left alone to engage in pursuits of 
choice and that will allow the individual to reap the benefits of his labor (Rapley, 
2003). Nao-classical theorist also argued that the government's regulation and 
taxation policies that aim to redistribute wealth are counterproductive in that they 
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cripple the efforts of individual initiative and innovation (Rapley, 2003). This in 
turn is detrimental to the progress of society (Rapley, 2003). The Nao-classical 
school maintains that free-market economies allow individuals and the society as 
a whole to benefit as opposed to command economies (Rapley, 2003). 
Accordingly, this renaissance resulted in neo-classical liberalism. 
Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
became increasingly conservative as their economic policy initiatives increased 
in developing countries (David, 1985). David (1985) gives an extensive analysis 
of the paradigmatic base of IMF policies in his book, The IMF Policy Paradigm: 
The Macroeconomics of Structural Adjustment, Stabilization and Economic 
Development that buttresses Rapley's (2003) discussion on the origins of neo-
classical economic policy. David (1985) points out that the IMF draws its 
economic views from a combination of neo-classical, Keynesian and Monetarist 
economic theories. 
There are four main principals that under gird the IMF's stance on policy 
as it concerns structural adjustment (David, 1985). First, there are certain 
universal factors that effect per capita income growth and they are capital 
accumulation, savings and industrialization. Conditions should be allowed and 
maintained in order for rapid accumulation to facilitate macroeconomic growth 
through a structure that is conductive to accelerated economic growth (David, 
1985). The second principal states that since there are scarce resources it is not 
possible to satisfy all of society's wants simultaneously. Therefore, resources 
should be used efficiently to satisfy material gains. The optimization of material 
gains will lead to more equitable distribution. If scarce resources are not used in 
an efficient manner the standard of living may fall and economic growth is 
jeopardized (David, 1985). 
A third principal is that the market should be given primacy in terms of 
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understanding and achieving the preferences and objectives of society (David, 
1985). The fourth principal is that there is preferred interest in a liberal world that 
is governed by liberal policies of free trade and exchange as the most favored 
path to development. In this sense the private market is viewed as the most 
efficient and effective instrument of allocating resources (David, 1985). 
In light of the above discussion the IMF's role can be seen. According to 
David (1985) and Vreeland (2003), the major goals of the IMF in carrying out its 
policy initiatives is to ensure the continuation and maintenance of a liberal free-
market oriented world environment in order to keep national and international 
communities prosperous. This means that the IMF promotes financial and 
economic cooperation among its member countries with the goal being the 
expansion and balanced growth of world trade (David, 1985). 
The implication of the IMF's policy objectives in regards to African 
countries is significant. The IMF has not always tried to ensure and enhance the 
individual development of African countries due to the fact that these are long 
range development challenges that its policies were not initially designed to 
address (David, 1985). In fact, the IMF has been mainly concerned with short-
term stabilization initiatives in its lending in order to ensure for the maintenance 
of the global economy (David, 1985, Kenen, 1986). In the next section, I discuss 
the implications of the IMF and the World Bank's policies in the implementation of 
SAPs in Africa. 
The Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies upon Implementation in African 
Countries 
Due to the economic decline of African countries in the 1970s and 80s the 
continent turned to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for 
assistance (Kalyalya and Semboja, 1988). These two financial institutions have 
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maintained a great deal of authority over Africa's economic policy. Campbell and 
Loxley (1989) note that not since the days of colonialism have external forces so 
powerfully shaped the economic agenda of African countries. The role of the 
World Bank has been more or less associated with long-term developmental 
issues while the International Monetary Fund has been more concerned with 
stabilization in the short-term (David, 1985, Hurni, 1970). The policies of these 
two multilateral lending institutions have shifted as many African countries began 
to gain independence (Vreeland, 2003, Meier, 1982). 
Initially the primary duty of the IMF involved the regulation of currency 
(McCarthy, 1999). However, in the 1970s its duties became more geared 
towards managing balance of payments problems (Vreeland, 2003). Africa, with 
its balance of payments problems became important to the IMF by the late 70s 
and early 80s (Vreeland, 2003). With the problems that African countries have 
experienced in the 1970s and 1980s the World Bank began addressing balance 
of payment problems just as the IMF (Rapley, 2003) . This was a shift from the 
World Bank's previous focus on poverty eradication in the long term (Rapley, 
2002). 
Additionally, in the 1970s and 1980s the influence of the International 
Monetary Fund grew substantially (Kenen, 1986). The IMF's policy focus in Africa 
was placed upon short-term stabilization and fiscal austerity measures (Rapley, 
2003). The IMF's influence grew in Africa because Africa's economic problems 
were seen as having the potential to disrupt the international economic 
environment (David, 1985). This gave the IMF much cause for concern since its 
main objective has always been to maintain the international economic 
environment. Bearing these issues in mind the IMF and the World Bank ushered 
in the policy prescriptions of structural adjustment in African countries. 
What did structural adjustment policies entail? Rapley (2003) outlines the 
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essence of the goals of structural adjustment policies. Essentially, structural 
adjustment seeks to make both the state and the market more efficient in such a 
way as to accelerate growth and eliminate waste (Rapley, 2003). Additionally, 
structural adjustment embodies the goals of neo-classical theory: it places the 
market at center stage, assigns the state a secondary role in development, and 
puts its faith in the potential of unfettered individual, initiative, creativity, and 
ingenuity (Rapley, 2003). 
Structural adjustment policies as implemented in Africa and other Third 
World countries generally included polices of fiscal austerity, privatization, trade 
liberalization, deregulation and currency devaluation (Aly, 1994;, Rapley, 2003;, 
Yansane, 1996;, Jackson, 2002;, ed Kalyalya, Mhlanga, Seidman, Semboja, 
1988,). 
Fiscal austerity involves reductions or the tightening of government 
spending (Rapley, 2003). Why reduce government spending? According to 
Rapley (2003), the logic of fiscal austerity is that the more money a government 
spends the more the government withdraws money from the economy. The 
money that is removed through taxation and borrowing by the government places 
the government in competition with private sector borrowers for scarce capitol 
(Rapley, 2003). In an effort to attract lenders, interest rates are then raised. This 
causes cuts in spending by consumers and businesses because the cost of 
credit by which so much lending is done becomes too high (Rapley, 2003). 
Additionally, when most governments spend on things such as welfare, 
subsidies, grants and salaries they waste investment potential (Rapley, 2003). 
Nee-classical logic says that this money should be more wisely used by investing 
as opposed to spending on such programs as welfare, so that it contributes less 
to inflation (Rapley, 2003). 
Structural adjustment policy maintains that by cutting spending, 
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governments will enable insurance cuts. In addition, by placing a cap on raises 
and cutting budgets governments can reduce inflation. Lastly, private investment 
will become cheaper making the environment for business more attractive, 
thereby helping economic activity to resume (Rapley, 2003). 
Privatization is based upon the assumption that the private market 
economy is best suited to maintain the economy as a whole (Rapley, 2003). 
Private owners have more interest in the maintenance of efficiency due to its 
interest in obtaining maximum profits as opposed to public sector managers 
(Rapley, 2003). Privatization should raise money for governments while 
enhancing the normal operations of the market and improve the efficiency of 
privatized firms (Rapley, 2003). 
Trade liberalization involves the efforts to reduce obstacles to trade with 
the goal of maximizing the freedom of the flow of goods and services (Rapley, 
2003). Liberalization involves the liberalization of foreign and domestic trade. 
Foreign trade is liberalized by; the elimination or the reduction of restrictions on 
imports and quotas, streamlining taxes on imports and devaluing overvalued 
currency (Rapley, 2003). Devaluation is encouraged to give exporters an 
incentive to produce more. Domestic liberalization involves the elimination of 
marketing boards and price controls (Rapley, 2003). Instituting such policies will 
serve to help eliminate excessive demand that is associated with balance of 
payments problems (Rapley, 2003). 
Rapley (2003) argues that many Third World countries were subsequently 
forced to accept neo-classical policies as a condition to obtaining loans from the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. He further states that most 
African countries found it almost impossible to stave off neo-classical driven 
structural adjustment policies due to the fact that these countries were the most 
vulnerable to external shocks and the most indebted (2003). Additionally, those 
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countries that chose to forego the implementation of structural adjustment 
policies found difficulty in obtaining much needed loans (Rapley, 2003). 
Nao-classical economic theory had a profound influence on the way in 
which African leaders would begin to govern their newly independent nations. 
Rapley (2003) accords this to the fact that the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund's more conservative posture would convince African countries to 
move away from statist policies. 
As the 1960s progressed and as African countries began gaining 
independence, neo-classical critiques of African economies gained more ground. 
These critiques both praised and criticized the economic policies of African 
governments. Such critiques consisted of the belief that contrary to popular 
belief, people in African countries were in fact rational agents and utility 
maximizers (Rapley, 2003). Critics also believed that peasants in African 
countries were responsive to price incentives (Rapley, 2003). 
Neo-classicist also began to question the relevance of governmental 
entities and actions that it considered counter to development objectives. Some 
of these include marketing boards of which neo-classicist believed were taking 
critical resources from development (Rapley, 2003). Neo-classicist believed that 
African governments were spending excessive amounts and that such spending 
had to be reduced. This meant that African governments needed to reduce high 
levels of demand (Rapley, 2003). Many scholars opine that structural adjustment 
policies have not accomplished economic growth, rather the incidence of poverty 
has increased substantially since SAP implementation. 
Many people under SAPs tended to experience marginalization. One such 
example was the small holders of Ghana that Tukane (2002) discusses in his 
research. Tsutomu Tukane (2002) undertook a case study in which he used 
empirical data to examine the role of small holders in the production and export 
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of pineapples, a non-traditional export product in Ghana. His study sought to 
analyze whether or not Ghanian small holders have any advantage over large-
scale producers. The study also sought to show whether or not there were 
constraints or opportunities that would assist or hinder Ghanaian small holders in 
the era of economic liberalization as encouraged through adjustment policies. 
Tukane (2002) found that there were unequal power relations between 
exporters and small holders in addition to large scale producers having some 
advantages over small holders. One example in regards to unequal power 
relations is that small holders usually were paid lower prices for their produce than 
the large-scale producers. Small holders were also at a disadvantage because 
they often had to wait long periods of time before receiving pay. In fact, months 
could pass before a small holder received pay (Tukane, 2002). 
Tukane (2002) found that the advantage that large-scale producers held 
over small holders was that they had access to more information. Large-scale 
producers rarely due to their location and other constraints had access to 
production information such as quality and bulk supply standards that exporters 
set. A lack of information severely hindered their profit making potential. Tukane 
(2002) concluded that due to the position of the small holders they were a 
marginalized group in the export of pineapples. He attributes this to the policies of 
the Bank and Fund's prescription of economic liberalization and rapid development 
that included the production and export of pineapples. Tukane (2002) believes that 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund should share some 
responsibility for the difficulty encountered by the Ghanaian small holders. 
Poverty has been a central theme discussed throughout the literature. 
Frances Stewart's (1995) work, Adjustment and Poverty, poignantly discusses 
the impact that the IMF and the World Bank's policies have had on the incidence 
of poverty in Africa. Most studies on the IMF and World Bank's impact on 
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development in Africa has revolved around a discussion on the increase in 
poverty due mainly to the implementation of structural adjustment policies. 
Stewart (1995) stresses that in order to understand how adjustment policies have 
affected poverty, it is of importance define poverty. She essentially defined 
poverty in terms of increases in absolute deprivation of basic human goods and 
services that inhibit human beings from achieving or pursuing a particular quality 
of life. In addition, she notes that the primary incomes of the poor are dependent 
upon the level of aggregate income and their share of that income. The poor are 
therefore dependant in terms of their income on the economic growth and 
income distribution within the growth cycle of the country (Stewart, 1995). 
Stewart (1995) believes that the Bank/Fund could have done more to 
curb exogenous developments that made adjustments necessary. She notes 
that the Bank/Fund should have made attempts to tackle exogenous factors such 
as falling commodity prices and exorbitant debt servicing. She also notes that 
these events were mistakenly taken as constraints to be accepted rather than 
challenged. In addition, the World Bank and IMF made a bad situation even 
worse through policies such as expenditure cuts and the reduction or elimination 
of food subsidies (Stewart, 1995). It is for these reasons that Stewart believes 
that the World Bank and the IMF should hold themselves in part accountable for 
adverse impacts on development that has occurred in Africa. 
Similarly, scholars such as Cheru (2002), Geo-Jaja and Magnum (2001) 
believe that structural adjustment policies infringe upon basic human rights and 
human development and therefore lead to poverty. Cheru (2002) contends that 
adjustment policies have jeopardized the right to food, education and health. 
Structural adjustment policies have called for cuts in government expenditures in 
the areas of health, food subsidies and education. The following analysis as 
taken from Cheru's (2002) work points out some of the ill effects of adjustment. 
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Deep reduction or elimination of subsidies and price controls that distort 
internal prices for a number of goods and services 
Drastic reduction of trade and exchange controls designed to protect the local 
economy from foreign competition 
High interest rates to fight inflation, promote savings and allocate investment 
capitol to the highest bidders 
Privatization of state owned firms, including the privatization of public goods 
and 
services (health care, education) 
In a study that Dr. Juliet A. Melville (2002) completed on the impact of 
structural adjustment on the poor, she notes some key findings in terms of the 
general impact that structural adjustment has had on the poor in developing 
countries. They are as follows. 
"Has Structural Adjustment led to Economic Growth? 
Answer: While the theoretical bases of IMFIWB policies are being questioned, 
there is an ongoing debate as to whether these programs have actually resulted 
in economic growth. The evidence points to slow growth or no growth, and in 
cases where growth was recorded the rates of growth achieved were below that 
of the pre adjustment period. Economist from the World Bank and IMF argue that 
slippage on the part of the countries is responsible for the poor performance 
observed. 
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Has Economic Growth led to Reduction in Poverty and Inequality? 
Answer: The findings suggest that SAPs have had a disproportionate and 
detrimental effect on the poor and inequality or at best the condition of the poor 
did not improve. Evidence has been gathered which shows that during growth 
episodes the poor may not benefit, and in fact the poor are more adversely 
affected during a downturn while an expansion may have a more limited effect 
(asymmetric effect) on the poor. Further, growth may give rise to increasing 
inequality. In countries that achieved moderate growth rates, increases in 
equality of primary income have been recorded. The new growth theories and the 
empirical evidence suggest that the traditional argument that inequality is good 
for growth has out lived its usefulness. In fact, according to the new growth 
theory, excessive inequality can retard growth. Additionally, empirical evidence 
reveals that countries with relatively egalitarian initial conditions tend to grow 
faster than those with high initial inequality. The IMF itself has put forward 
evidence that inequality may hinder growth and that equitable adjustment may be 
more sustainable." 
Geo-Jaja and Magnum (2001) note that economic adjustment programs 
are not working in terms of helping to facilitate human development in 
numerous areas such as in health, education and employment. Napier (2001) 
believes that the World Bank and the IMF should allow room for African 
governments to make decisions in regards to structural adjustment policies as 
they relate to the basic constitutional structure of African states. This is 
necessary because of the fact that when structural adjustment policies are 
implemented not much attention is paid to questions of how the policies relate to 
state legitimacy, politics, constitutionalism, economic development, civil society, 
and regional organizations in an overall African context (Napier, 2001 ). 
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While the aforementioned scholars view adjustment policies as a huge 
contributor to poverty some scholars make the claim that these arguments do not 
hold firmly. Demery and Squire (1996) believe that the emergence of more 
detailed household surveys in Africa is needed in order to get a clearer picture as 
to whether or not structural adjustment policies hurt or help African countries. 
They present quantitative data on six countries in Africa from a survey 
undertaken by The International Food Policy Research Institute and The Institute 
of Development Research in Addis Ababa. The data shows that in four adjusting 
countries the poverty level significantly declined. Demery and Squire (1996) 
contend that the decline in the poverty levels of these countries can be attributed 
to the rate of economic growth in which these four adjusting countries have 
experienced a period of economic growth. 
The question that arises as a result of Demery and Squire's (1996) 
findings is does growth lead to poverty reduction? While Demery and Squire 
mainly view economic growth as the main culprit in poverty reduction and 
creation, Stewart (1995) believes that other factors are needed in order to 
determine whether poverty is being reduced or is in fact progressing. Stewart 
(1995) contends that there is absolute versus relative poverty wherein she 
believes that absolute poverty is a more accurate representation because it 
defines poverty in terms of a population's access or denial of access to basic 
human needs. Absolute poverty should be considered more closely when 
assessing whether or not poverty is actually being reduced (Stewart, 1995). 
While it is of no doubt that the debate in regards to poverty alleviation and 
its indicators will continue it is equally of no doubt that many African countries 
may continue to suffer from severe levels of poverty. Naiman and Watkins (1999) 
in their study, "A Survey of the Impacts of Structural Adjustment in Africa: 
Growth, Social Spending and Debt Relief," discuss how adjustment policies have 
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impacted African countries. They have relied upon data and findings of the 
internal (IMF/World Bank Sponsored) and external reviews (Harvard Institute for 
International Development, Oxford University, Free University and Yale 
University). According to Naiman and Watkins (1999) in regards to poverty the 
data has indicated that those African countries who have implemented ESAF or 
Enhansed Structural Facility Programs, a component of structural adjustment, 
have fared far worse than non-ESAF countries in terms of declines in per capita 
income. Subsequently, these countries have experienced an increase in poverty 
(Naiman and Watkins, 1999). The following excerpt from Naiman and Watkins 
illustrates the point: 
Annual real per capita GDP growth averaged 0.0% for all ESAF 
countries over the period 1991-1995, whereas non-ESAF developing 
countries experienced, on average, 1.0% annual real per capita GDP 
growth. 
Sub-Saharan African countries with ESAF programs experienced 
an average annual 3% decline in real per capita incomes over the period 
of IMF adjustment from 1991-1995 
According to Naiman and Watkins (1999), when household income is 
reduced along with a reduction in governmental expenditures for things such 
as food subsidies, poverty increases because the poor cannot afford to do 
such things as send their children to school or to the clinic. 
An empirical analysis of a survey of households in Zambia conducted by 
Dr.Buleti Nsemukila (2001) bolsters Naiman and Watkin's (1999) claim in regards 
to the way in which poverty has increased. The survey suggests that poverty is 
an important determinant of chronic household food insecurity since the poor do 
not have adequate entitlements to secure food even when the food is readily 
available. According to Nsemukila (2001 ), while the restructuring predicated by 
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structural adjustment programs is necessary to rebuild the economy, the impact 
upon the welfare of the majority of people has had and continues to have 
adverse impacts. In addition, it has been difficult for the poor in Zambia since 
adjustment programs began, to secure food and other essentials. In Zambia, 
between1991-1998 poverty levels increased from 67 percent to 73 percent 
(Nsemukila, 2001 ). The following factors according to 
Nsemukila's (2001) survey has contributed to increases in poverty in Zambia: 
Low income levels among the poor 
Low labor market participation 
Poor health 
Poor education 
Poor access to public services 
Poor living conditions 
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Trends in the Literature 
The overarching trend that is demonstrated in the literature is that structural 
adjustment has tended to have adverse impacts on the delivery of social services 
and on poverty reduction. Another important trend is the increasing willingness of 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to hold themselves 
accountable for the adverse impacts of structural adjustment policies. Much of 
the literature suggests that there is a movement towards accountability among the 
IMF and the World Bank. 
According to Pender (2001) the two international financial institutions are 
moving towards looking at development in a broader light with increased attention 
paid to the poor. They have increasingly emphasized partnerships between 
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donors and governments and between governments and civil society (Pender, 
2001 ).Within this broader outlook, conditionality is no longer focused solely on 
economic growth, rather it is focused on redirecting society's resources to the 
needs of the less fortunate (Pender, 2001 ). This new outlook began with the 
appointment of James Wolfensohn in 1995 as the World Bank's president and 
with the 1997 appointment of Joseph Stiglitz as the World Bank's chief economist 
(Pender, 2001 ). 
It appears that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has 
began to see that many of their policies are having an adverse affect on the poor 
in Africa and on the development process. Indeed, in the World Bank's 
publication, Can Africa Claim the 21 51 Century? (2000), the Bank devotes 
discussion to the strategies of forming partnerships and reducing the debt burden 
in addition to investing in human capitol. This seems to indicate that a shift within 
the developmental thinking towards Africa is occurring. 
Why did the two international financial institutions decide to consider 
accountability? One reason is that numerous sectors of the world community have 
criticized the policies of the Bank/Fund. According to scholars such as Pender 
(2001) and Cheru (2002), severe criticism of policies has caused the Bank/Fund 
to re-examine its approach. Thomas-Emeagwali (1995) notes that the World 
Bank in recent reports has admitted to their own shortcomings as an organization 
and are making an effort to institute changes. 
The literature has shown that the previous stance taken by the World Bank 
and IMF in regards to the primary focus on economic growth seems to have 
lessened when we consider the period from the early adjustment years to more 
recent times. The Bank/Fund seems to be on the road to as Cheru (2002) puts it, 
emphasizing, "sustainable economic growth combined with social justice". 
Although the move that the Bank/Fund has made towards accountability may 
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seem worthy of applause, there are those who believe that the Bank/Fund must 
make even more changes and improvements. Napier (2001) believes that the 
Bank/Fund's views concerning macro and micro level accountability should go 
further than in its policy objectives. He believes that one aspect of macro-level 
accountability involves constitutional and legal dimensions in that the people 
should be able to do things such as vote on whether or not they want to have the 
assistance of the international community in their country. In the event that the 
people elect to have such intervention they should be able to elect those who will 
protect their interest. In Napier's (2001) view, it is in the best interest of the 
Bank/Fund's developmental agenda to consider these kinds of concerns. 
Perhaps the trend overtime is that both proponents and critics alike of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund will be able to create an effective and 
acceptable solution to the problems that persist in African Countries that SAPs 
have been implemented to address. 
In the next chapter I discuss Sierra Leone and its experience with SAPs. 
The major focus leans towards providing an answer as to the question of why 
Sierra Leone decided to institute SAPs in the first place. 
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Chapter Two 
The Rationale for Structural Adjustment Policies in 
Sierra Leone 
This chapter discusses the conditions that caused Sierra Leone to seek 
the assistance of the IMF and the World Bank. During the first decade after 
independence most African economies were growing (Adepoju ;, 1993, Weeks, 
1992;, Onimode, 1988). However, African countries were amongst the slowest 
growing economies as compared to other developing countries (Weeks, 1992). By 
comparison with other African countries Sierra Leone was considered a disaster 
case by the IMF and the World Bank (Weeks, 1992). With this in mind, an 
important question to ask is what was the essence of the economic problems that 
propelled Sierra Leone into economic collapse? In order to adequately answer 
this question, it is of importance to discuss the nature of Sierra Leone's history 
and political economy. 
Some Facts about Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone is a small country that is located at the southwestern coast of 
Africa (Magbaily-Fyle, 1981 ). Its population currently stands at a little over 5 
million people (World Bank, 2000). It is approximately 73, 326 square kilometers 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1981 ). The country has varied reliefs that range from coastal 
swamps to the highest mountain ranges such as Bintumani (Magbaily-Fyle, 
1993). The average height of Sierra Leone is 617 feet above sea level (Magbaily-
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Fyle, 1981 ). Sierra Leone has nine rivers that are small when compared to other 
rivers in Africa. However, they serve as Sierra Leone's drainage system. These 
rivers generally flow in a south westerly direction (Magbaily-Fyle, 1981 ). 
There are two major seasons that consists of the dry season that occurs 
from December to April and the rainy season that occurs throughout the rest of 
the year (Magbaily-Fyle, 1981 ). The mean annual rainfall over two-thirds of the 
country is between 100 and 120 inches (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). The coastal belt 
has rainfall between 130 to 170 inches. On the Peninsula Mountains, where 
Freetown is located, annual rainfall increases to more than 200 inches (Magbaily-
Fyle, 1981 ). 
Sierra Leone's vegetation at one time consisted of mostly forest but has 
since been reduced due to slash and burn techniques (Magbaily-Fyle, 1981 ). 
Other kinds of vegetation include, grassland mixed with farm bush in the northern 
plateau regions in addition to mangrove swamps along the coasts (Magbaily-
Fyle, 1981}. 
This small country of which the Portuguese were the first Europeans to 
discover (I use this term loosely) in the sixteenth century, has in later years gone 
through numerous economic and political changes. Sierra Leone has been 
subjected to poverty and violence, namely the civil war that occurred from 1991-
2000. Although there were many factors that contributed to the civil war, some of 
the most important were access to resources in the form of the stoppage of basic 
social services to the populace at large. 
26 
Historical Background on Sierra Leone 
The history and people of Sierra Leone are both complex and fascinating. The 
major ethnic groups of the country are the Temne, Mende and the Limba. The 
Limba are the oldest ethnic group in Sierra Leone (Conteh-Morgan, Dixon-Fyle, 
1999). In Sierra Leone as in any region of the world internal conflict was an aspect 
of the society. Conflicts between groups were mainly over territory. Many groups 
found it necessary to migrate to more fertile lands for the sustenance of their 
people. 
Political organization was a key aspect of conflict resolution. Political 
organization stressed consultation and consensus. The organizational structure 
was comprised of kings, chiefs and elders. Components of this structure also 
included a system of checks and balances in addition to patron-client networks. 
What was beneficial about this system was the fact that the system provided for 
the sustenance of its people. 
External Influences Enter Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone was a major trading post for Europeans during the colonial 
period. The Portuguese entered Sierra Leone in the 1460s during the period of 
mercantilism. It was in this period that Africa's incorporation into the capitalist 
global economy began with the emergence of the slave trade. Africa's 
incorporation was complete by the nineteenth century. 
The coastal ruling class in Sierra Leone traded slaves in return for guns 
and other luxury goods. The traders in Sierra Leone also provided for the 
protection of the Portuguese as they explored Sierra Leone. The coastal ruling 
class had consolidated power through obtaining guns from the Europeans. These 
early trade relations marked the emergence of a new source of ethnic conflict. 
The source of conflict resulted from external intervention into the economy of 
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Sierra Leone. 
In 1516, the British entered Africa along with the Dutch and the French. 
Their goal was to cripple the dominance that the Portuguese had established in 
relation to trade. Eventually, it was the British who became victorious. 
The Emergence of Class Structure 
One strategy that the British used was to marry the daughters of prominent 
Sierra Leonean families. The result of this union was a new ruling elite that had 
both British and Sierra Leonean blood. This class was also known as the Afro-
British Mulatto class. 
In 1787, with the help of the British the Krio emerged as a new class. This 
class was comprised of ex-slaves who had fought on the side of the British in the 
independence wars and also ex-slaves from Jamaica and Nova Scotia. After the 
end of slavery former slaves begin to migrate to different parts of Europe. The 
Europeans viewed this as problematic. Granville Sharpe, a missionary abolitionist, 
was pivotal in the establishment of Freetown located in Sierra Leone as a means 
of solving the problem of migration for ex-slaves and Europeans. 
Note: All the issues discussed in th is section on the historical background of Sierra Leone have been written on the basis of 
the work of scholars Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle (1999). Please see Bibliography for further information. 
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The new settler town that soon emerged was established on the basis of the 
principals of Christianity and capitalism. 
How did the Indigenous people respond to these events? First, Freetown 
originally belonged to the Temne Kingdom of Koya. King Tom; the local Temne 
ruler was initially receptive to the settlement. However, after the death of King 
Tom, the new rulers signed a treaty in 1788 with the British under false pretenses. 
The treaty took sovereignty away from the Temne rulers and gave it to the new 
settlers. 
In 1791 the British formed a company to serve the needs of the emerging 
capitalist produce market and called it the Sierra Leone Company. The British 
decided to recruit former slaves from Nova Scotia and Jamaica to help run the 
administration of the company. With the backing of the British, the new settler 
class found themselves in a more privileged position than that of the Indigenous 
population of Sierra Leone. 
Friction began to arise between the British, the Krios and the Indigenous 
population. By 1793 the Temne ruler wanted to establish a new treaty, however, 
the British did not want to comply because they felt that the establishment of a 
new treaty might jeopardize their economic interests which was manifested in the 
form of the Sierra Leone Company. The Temne briefly began moving against 
Freetown in order to regain control over the territory. However, in the end the 
Temne relinquished control of the territory. In 1808 Freetown became a colony of 
the British. In 1895 Indigenous people were declared protected persons. 
The Krio saw the declaration of the Indigenous peoples' new status as 
protected persons as detrimental to their influence on the British. The Krio 
understood that the Indigenous people with their new status could possibly 
become more influential among the British, given the fact that the hinterland in 
which the Indigenous people lived, was of strategic economic interest to the 
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British. The British style of indirect rule provided the British and the Indigenous 
people of the hinterland an opportunity to establish a relationship that was 
conductive to the maximum extraction of raw materials from the hinterland. The 
Krios were fearful that this raised the protected persons' political standing with 
the British. During this period the foundations of class structure was firmly 
c.emented. The following outline presents the picture of class structure that was 
formed within this period. 
Foreign Bourgeoisie (Europeans, Krios, Lebanese) 
African Bourgeoisie (Political elites, commercial elites, petty bourgeoisie) 
African Proletariat (located in urban areas and paid a set wage) Lumpen 
Proletariat (Unemployed or underemployed individuals located in urban 
settings) 
African Peasantry (rural, largest wealth producing class, they produce 
food and raise livestock) 
The class structure established within this period resulted in a two nation 
dichotomy. There were the Indigenous Africans whose social characteristics 
consisted of marginalization, polarization and the need for general uplift in the 
eyes of the British. The other nation was the Krios. The Krios tried to emulate 
Western attitudes and values of Christianity, capitalism and the civilized life. 
Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle (1999) put it best when they stated, 
"Here in lay in part the factors that would bedevil the relations between the Krio 
and the other ethnic groups in the coming years and the unfortunate divide that 
would initiate attempts at national cohesion in the critical years that lay ahead" 
(p59). 
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The decades that followed independence (independence gained in April 
of 1961) in Sierra Leone were tumultuous. As mentioned previously, Sierra 
Leone had been experiencing a number of economic problems since 
independence. The decline of the economy began in the 1960s and as the 
decades proceeded the economic situation became worse. One factor that may 
have significantly contributed to the further decline of Sierra Leone's economic 
situation was the introduction and implementation of neo-classily driven structural 
adjustment policies. These policies were prescribed by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank as a corrective to the economic problems 
that persisted in Sierra Leone. 
The purpose of this thesis is to show that structural adjustment programs 
may have had an adverse impact on the delivery of social services in Sierra 
Leone. This thesis focuses on the impact that structural adjustment may have 
had on health, education and employment in Sierra Leone. The decline in the 
provision of the delivery of these basic services seems to have had serious 
implications for poverty and violence. 
The final chapter of this thesis argues that structural adjustment policies 
in the case of Sierra Leone may have contributed to the conditions that led to the 
civil war that took place between 1991 and 2000. However, for now I return to the 
political economy of Sierra Leone. 
The Political Economy of Sierra Leone 1961-1971 
Sierra Leone gained its independence from the British in the year 1961 
(Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, 1999). During the first decade of independence 
the Sierra Leonean economy paradoxically experienced growth and showed 
signs of stagnation. As noted in the literature review, Sierra Leone's real GDP 
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growth rate was at 5 per cent up to 1972.This was due in large part to its mineral 
exports and to favorable terms of trade for agricultural products (Adepoju, 1993). 
Even after the first oil shocks real economic growth remained above 3 per cent 
annually until 1975 and fell just under 2 per cent from 1975 to 1980 (Adepoju, 
1993). 
With growth present during its first decade of independence Sierra 
Leone's economy also began to show signs of decline. Some symptoms of 
decline included; slow growth, balance of payments problems and the decline of 
key economic sectors, such as the closing of the mining industry in 1976 (Weeks, 
1992). 
It is reasonable to assert that the first decade of independence 
was an economic paradox. On the one hand there was economic 
growth yet on the other there were signs of stagnation. How can this 
paradox be explained? Reno's (1995) arguments suggest that 
corruption in Sierra Leone led to both decline and growth. Weeks 
(1992) suggests that the IMF and the World Bank's structural 
adjustment policies have contributed significantly to economic failure in 
Sierra Leone. He posits that the relationship that began in 1967 set the 
tone for this failure. 
Reno's (1995) book, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, 
suggests that economic growth during the first decade of independence was 
fueled by corruption and the need for political leaders to gain and maintain power. 
The political and economic power struggle was in large part over who was to 
maintain control over Sierra Leone's most important economic region, that of the 
diamond rich Kono district (Reno, 1995). In order to enhance our understanding of 
the political economy that eventually led to economic chaos I include the following 
three sections. The first section will discuss the political economy of the colonial 
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administration. The second section will discuss the Steven's administration. 
Finally, the third section will discuss the Momoh administration. All sections will 
discuss comparisons between the colonial and post colonial administrations. 
The Colonial Political Legacy 
The British colonial government had established patron client-relations 
during pre-independence years (Reno, 1995).Within this period patron-client 
relations consisted of expensive pay-outs to chiefs that consequently took money 
away from development projects (Reno, 1995). But how did this political situation 
come about? The emergence of class relations dictated by class interest seemed 
to play a great role in the establishment of patron-client relations. The major 
classes within Sierra Leone prior to independence were the British Europeans, the 
Krios and the indigenous Sierra Leoneans. Within this class hierarchy, the British 
were on top, the Krios in the middle and the native Sierra Leoneans on the bottom. 
In essence, a situation is presented wherein there was an upper class, a middle 
class and the lower classes. Later, other ethnic groups such as the Lebanese who 
may be considered middle class took their place within this hierarchical class 
system. With such a class system in place the question now becomes how could 
the colonial government maintain effective control over classes beneath it? 
The British system of indirect rule was the means to achieving the control 
that they wanted to establish and maintain over those in Sierra Leone. This system 
according to Khapoya (1998) was a system of inequality. The British believed in 
separation along class and racial lines. For example, Africans had to make use of 
separate but unequal public facilities such as schools, hospitals and transportation. 
Additionally, the British did not believe in the social equality of African people. 
However, the British knew that at some point the Africans would exercise political 
power in their countries (Khapoya, 1998). This meant that political power could 
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only be exercised by Africans over other Africans (Khapoya, 1998). 
In their belief that Africans would one day exercise power in their own 
countries, they imposed the system of indirect rule. However this was not the only 
reason that indirect rule became the chosen political strategy. Other motives can 
be seen in looking at the definition of British indirect rule. According to Khapoya 
(1998), it is the process of identifying the local power structure wherein the kings, 
chiefs and headmen would be identified and invited, bribed or coerced to become 
apart of the colonial power structure while retaining considerable political power 
over the people in their own areas. Further, in exchange for becoming apart of this 
structure through enforcing local laws, collecting taxes and being accountable 
directly to the British governor, chiefs, kings and headmen were given protection, a 
salary and a house among other gifts (Khapoya, 1998). 
Khapoya (1998) notes that indirect rule served the interests of the British 
in many ways. One significant way was that indirect rule did not allow for inter 
ethnic interaction through political organization and in other economic relations. In 
fact, indirect rule encouraged disunity through encouraging separate ethnic 
identities (Khapoya, 1998). This kind of divide served the interest of the British 
well since they feared that unity would lead to wide spread resistance (Khapoya, 
1998). Their native collaborators would serve to provide a chance for the British to 
carry out their most important colonial objective of extracting wealth from Sierra 
Leone. However, as the British implemented their brand of political administration, 
they may have contributed to the foundation for later political and economic chaos 
in Sierra Leone. 
Reno (1995) notes that the similarities between what he refers to as the 
shadow state in Sierra Leone and the British colonial government are great. The 
two most important things that they shared were that both the colonial and post-
independence administrations succumbed to accommodation of elites in order to 
34 
maintain political power. Secondly, the colonial and post-independence leaders 
failed at development and in so doing neglected the Sierra Leonean population. 
Chiefs in Sierra Leone carried out tasks that the state was either unable or 
unwilling to perform. This came about because most British officials did not want to 
officiate matters directly in the hinterland of Sierra Leone (Reno, 1995). For 
example, in the district of Kono, district officers were always eager to be 
reappointed or promoted because many did not want to contend with health 
hazards in the region (Reno, 1995). The chiefs therefore served the goals of the 
British to achieve administrative effectiveness and control over the hinterland 
population (Reno, 1995). 
In return for their accommodation they were rewarded with material 
benefits (Reno, 1995). The establishment of indirect rule in the hinterland would 
later provide lucrative benefits to both the British and to chiefs (Reno, 1995). The 
hinterland was rich in the natural resources that the British needed to fuel their 
commercial and industrial interest. These resources would help to make the British 
the top economic power during this time. The chiefs provided the British with a 
cheap way to maintain control over this area. 
The chiefs benefited from opportunities to participate in trade involving such 
tradables as groundnuts, ivory, gold and later diamonds (Reno, 1995). The 
revenue that chiefs gained from trade allowed them to field standing armies 
through the purchase of firearms and thereby to forcibly incorporate others in 
neighboring villages (Reno, 1995). 
The political relationship that the British had established seemed reciprocal in 
nature. However, the British stood to benefit the most both politically and 
economically from this relationship. According to Reno, (1995) the cooperation of 
chiefs provided for a tributary relationship wherein the chiefs agreed to protect the 
interests of the British so that it was possible for the colonial power to extract 
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economic resources. The chiefs also benefited in that they were able to increase 
their power politically and economically in their respective villages. They were able 
to establish relationships wherein others became dependant upon them for political 
and economic privilege. In essence, the British were dependant upon the chiefs to 
provide social stability so that they could carry out their economic and political 
objectives. Because of this dependant relationship the chiefs were able to obtain a 
level of control. However, this relationship was by no means one without its share 
of problems. 
The British were always afraid that the chiefs would gain too much 
independent power and over step the bounds of their relationship (Reno, 1995). In 
this vein they were always focused on maintaining control over chiefs' activities as 
they sought to ensure that the chiefs maintained control in the hinterland. 
Controlling the activities of chiefs was also a concern of post-independence 
leaders (Reno, 1995). Leaders such as Stevens and Momoh were concerned with 
controlling the activities of chiefs and their cronies who were also known as 
strongmen in order to maintain political and economic control. 
Because the chiefs derived their authority from their place in the colonial 
hierarchy there were limits to what they could and could not do (Reno, 1995). One 
activity that the colonial administration sought to control was chiefs' activities in 
regard to trade. In 1905 the colonial administration placed restrictions on chiefs' 
power in regards to trade (Reno, 1995). The ordinance stated that, "Any tribal ruler 
who uses the powers conferred on him so as to impede, restrain or interfere with 
the free course of trade shall be liable upon conviction to deposition" (Reno, 1995, 
p38). However, as Reno notes, chiefs did not pursue matters of trade entirely on 
British terms due to the fact of circumstances beyond the control of the British. 
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Chiefs were able to take advantage of these economic circumstances because 
there was no development to attract outside investment in the hinterland. Because 
of this situation chiefs were able to hold a stronger position in trade (Reno, 1995). 
One example of how the British had to concede a portion of economic 
control to chiefs is the model farm that was created for the production of export 
crops. These farms were built with government funds but due to poor links to trade 
in the hinterland, model farms were turned over to chiefs who gained control over 
production and trade (Reno, 1995). This demonstrates that whether the British 
preferred to or not they had to accommodate chiefs in order to achieve their 
political and economic objectives. Similarly, during post independence, Sierra 
Leonean leaders had to accommodate political rivals in order to achieve their 
political and economic objectives. 
There were similarities between the IMF /World Bank and the British. Just 
as the IMF and the World Bank believe in policies of economic austerity so did the 
colonial administration in Sierra Leone believe in the principal of fiscal austerity 
(Reno, 1995). The British wanted to proceed with expenditure cuts in order to 
make the cost of ruling Sierra Leone as inexpensive as possible while the British 
themselves acquired as much wealth as possible (Reno, 1995). The British quest 
for wealth led many Sierra Leoneans to social unrest. Similarly, political elites 
quest for wealth in post- independence Sierra Leone has provoked social unrest . 
One example of social unrest that socio-economic problems heavily 
contributed to was the Hut Tax War. The major reason that this war broke out was 
due to the fact that the people could hardly pay taxes required of them by the 
British government. They felt that the British government was going too far in its 
attempt to extract taxes from their already impoverished circumstances. As a 
result, many, particularly in the hinterland decided to revolt. 
However, it was not the British alone who made attempts at extracting taxes. 
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While the Hut Tax War was an example of elite accommodation it was also an 
example of how British and African collaborations benefited as a minority but 
distressed the majority of Sierra Leoneans. How then did chiefs receive 
accommodation? Chiefs were accommodated by receiving a portion of the 
revenues to be collected from the tax (Reno, 1995). However, it posed a great 
economic burden on the many of whom the tax would be extracted from. This has 
been the case with modern IMF and World Bank programs. While the monies that 
the political leaders receive from the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund goes for the benefit of supporting their political supporters the majority of the 
population suffers when hard line fiscal austerity measures are implemented. 
The discovery of diamonds energized the economy of Sierra Leone. 
However, this discovery only benefited a few. Although the Sierra Leone Selection 
Trust Company, a subsidiary of DeBeers Corporation signed a ninety-nine year 
monopoly on the exploration of mining, they encountered great difficulty in 
controlling the mines (Reno, 1995). The colonial government and DeBeers did not 
want indigenous Africans to take part in mining (Reno, 1995). To achieve their 
goal , SLSTC brought in armed security to ensure that Indigenous Africans did not 
take part in mining activities (Reno, 1995). However, elite accommodation was 
applied when the company had to depend on chiefs to control illicit mining (Reno, 
1995). The SLSTC without the consent of the colonial government began paying 
chiefs to adhere to arrangements to protect the mining areas from elicit mining 
(Reno, 1995). 
Although the government tried to abolish this action on the assumption that 
it would encourage chiefs to seek and expect financial gain, the practice was not 
eliminated (Reno, 1995). In addition, even with payment the chiefs continued to 
allow illicit mining. The discovery of diamonds served to benefit the British and a 
minority of African individuals while providing no widespread benefits to the Sierra 
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Leonean people. 
The Political Economy of the Siaka Stevens Administration 1968-1986 
Siaka Stevens'administration was one that was driven by the need to 
establish and maintain control over politics and the economy. The administration 
needed to control the economy which meant securing control over all means of 
access to wealth and to exert firm authority that would come especially through 
controlling political rivals (Reno, 1995). This required that Stevens establish and 
maintain an intimate connection to the diamond industry. As Stevens sought to 
maintain power through political patronage, the economy gradually declined. This 
came as result of policies that were geared toward elite accommodation instead 
of policies that would strengthen the economy in the long term (Reno, 1995). 
Siaka Stevens administration can be greatly understood by looking at his 
problems and the sources, his strategies for solving the problems and the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of his strategies. 
Siaka Stevens, a member of the APC, came to power in 1968 (Reno, 
1995). Stevens's role as ruler of Sierra Leone was very similar to that of the British. 
Just like the British, Stevens had to find a way to establish and maintain control 
over politics and economic resources. Stevens's primary goal as leader of Sierra 
Leone was to establish control over access to resources and to cement his 
authority (Reno, 1995). However, just as in the case of the British administration, 
Stevens would have to overcome numerous obstacles to accomplish his goals. 
One of the most important, if not the most important means of establishing political 
authority was to gain control over the diamond resources. Controlling diamond 
resources ensured that Stevens would have a firm grip on the political and 
economic structure in Sierra Leone (Reno, 1995). 
Again, just as in the case of the British, in order to control economic 
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resources Stevens had to establish authority over old elites that mainly included 
chiefs from the previous Albert Magari regime (Reno, 1995). Many of these chiefs 
held elite privileges that included control over diamond mines. These elites who 
had been accommodated for so long were unwilling to discard their privileges 
(Reno, 1995). Stevens felt that in order to maintain his power he would have to find 
some way to control resources as well as the old elites who were so closely tied to 
those resources (Reno, 1995). 
Stevens employed an array of strategies as he sought to establish his 
authority. Some of his most important strategies included; cooption or elite 
accommodation, establishing control of the wealth, the banishment of political 
rivals and the opening up of the economy to foreign investment (Reno, 1995). 
Stevens major strategy for dealing with the problem of the old elite was 
cooption also know as elite accommodation (Reno, 1995). However, he could not 
carry this strategy forward without resources. Diamonds were inextricably tied to 
political power (Reno, 1995). Stevens was well aware of this. The old privileged 
elites would not allow Stevens to assert his control without putting up a struggle. In 
fact , at the beginning of Stevens's rule he had great difficulty in establishing his 
authority (Reno, 1995). 
The diamond rich Kono district exemplifies the latter point. Soon after 
Stevens came to power his administration's aim was to collect tax revenues, bring 
mining under state control and in the process stop illicit mining in Kono (Reno, 
1995). However, Kono politics was organized to effectively counter Stevens's aims. 
Paul Dunbar's political strength in Kono would present obstacles to 
Stevens (Reno, 1995). Paul Dunbar was a person who had been around for many 
years and had established a stronghold on the political process in Kono (Reno, 
1995). He had family ties to at least three ruling chiefdom households and had the 
support of the Magaris, the regimes that preceded Stevens, in addition to the 
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support of much of the populace of Kono (Reno, 1995). Therefore, his power was 
well entrenched. In the era of the administration of the Magaris he was allowed to 
form a private armed action group (Reno, 1995). His army used tactics of 
intimidation that had been used for years to control Kono (Reno, 1995). As a result 
of Dunbar's tactics Stevens was unable achieve his aims (Reno, 1995). 
Another of Stevens strategies was aimed at controlling local politics in the 
Kono district. In this effort he sought to banish rivals on the local level (Reno, 
1995). He found an opportunity to accomplish the banishment of political rivals 
when a prominent Tankoro chief died. When a prominent Tankoro chief of the 
Kono district died, elections were held to elect a new chief (Reno, 1995). Stevens 
was presented with both opportunity and dilemma. The opportunity resided in the 
possibility that he could infiltrate local politics through running an APC candidate. 
The dilemma that confronted him was that he would have to worry about 
controlling the candidate so that he would not establish his own independent power 
base (Reno, 1995). 
Stevens backed John Kellie, a populist leader among miners in Kono 
(Reno, 1995). Although Kellie was a member of the APC he was a local politician 
who mainly upheld local issues with little regard for the national interest of the 
Stevens administration. Kellie's lack of concern for central politics was due 
primarily to the fact of APC organizational weakness in the 1967 election. 
Stevens's solution to controlling his fellow APC party member was 
cooption. In order to prevent Kellie from establishing an independent power base 
Stevens allocated direct aid in the form of money and officials to support Kellie's 
. campaign (Reno, 1995). In this way Kellie was now tied directly to Steven's 
interests (Reno, 1995). However, the political organization in Kono with Dunbar at 
its head proved too strong for Stevens and he could not prevent the SLPP's 
candidate from winning the election (Reno, 1995). 
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The SLPP's win demonstrated that Stevens's authority was weak (Reno, 
1995). This had implications for government revenues. The Stevens administration 
lost control over the collection of ta><es, the capacity to carry out development 
projects and to fund many of its own operations (Reno, 1995). In addition, the 
government could not control elicit mining which was a major source of 
government revenues (Reno, 1995). 
As stated earlier, Stevens encountered some setbacks in terms of 
establishing his political authority to build his strong state. As time passed Stevens 
found more effective means of gaining control over the economy and cementing 
his power. One way in which he achieved this was through allowing foreign 
investors to gain control over certain sectors of the economy (Reno, 1995). In this 
way he created legal barriers to the economic ambitions of his rivals while at the 
same time creating relations wherein political competitors became dependant upon 
his favor (Reno, 1995). Using this strategy of cooption was good for Stevens in 
terms of providing resources needed to maintain his power but bad for fiscal policy 
(Reno, 1995). 
One of the first foreign investors that Stevens sought to attract was Lonrho, 
a British mining firm (Reno, 1995). Their deal was to set up a joint venture in iron 
mining in the Northern district of Kono. The deal would give Stevens revenue and 
control over the distribution of economic development. However, this relationship 
folded when the mining company attempted to play factions of the APC party 
against one another (Reno, 1995). 
In yet still another effort to control the political economy of Sierra Leone, 
Stevens came to an agreement with longtime foreign investor SLSTC, a subsidiary 
of DeBeers, where a new state owned company, National Diamond Mining 
Company or NDMC, would mine and market diamonds and a portion of the 
proceeds would go directly into state revenues (Reno, 1995). This would give 
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Stevens a legal means of controlling political advisors. This strategy, however, 
failed to prevent illicit diamond activities (Reno, 1995). Diamond revenues, the 
major source of revenue for the government dropped from 25 percent from the 
highs achieved in 1968 to 1.4 million carrots in 1973 due to illicit mining activities 
(Reno, 1995). 
To curb these activities Stevens had to eliminate the autonomy of the illicit 
mining sector (Reno, 1995). This meant that he had to break the ties between 
mutually beneficial landlord- tenant relationships between officials and illicit miners 
(Reno, 1995). As a result, the NDMC required that a license be obtained before 
any mining could take place. Stevens exerted direct control over the issuance of 
licenses (Reno, 1995). 
He was in a position to favor the foreign Lebanese over Indigenous 
Africans. The Lebanese were not a new group in Sierra Leone. They had began 
arriving and establishing themselves as traders as early as 1892 (Magbaily-Fyle, 
1981 ). Stevens chose the Lebanese over Indigenous Sierra Leoneans because 
constitutional and popular prohibitions against ethnic-non Africans made it so that 
they were not allowed to participate in politics (Reno, 1995). Therefore, Stevens 
made the Lebanese dependent upon his favor as he also discriminated against 
Indigenous Africans (Reno, 1995). 
Lebanese or Afro-Lebanese dealers received the majority of new licenses 
issued by the Ministry of Mines (Reno, 1995). For example, in 1968 Lebanese 
dealers had only received 28 licenses (Reno, 1995). However, by 1973 that 
number jumped to 107 licenses (Reno, 1995). By allowing the Lebanese to 
establish a foothold in the economy Stevens finally achieved control over the 
private diamond mining industry. By incorporating the Lebanese into the economic 
framework, Stevens had effectively created a political network wherein political 
and economic factions became dependent upon him for favor (Reno, 1995). 
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According to Reno (1995) although Stevens had effectively established 
control over access to wealth through his political strategies, his policies were not 
necessarily fiscally sound. In addition, according to Reno (1995) his economic 
policy galvanized resentment from the populace and eventually policy choices 
would lead him to seek assistance from the IMF and the World Bank. 
Popular opinion showed both resentment and disappointment in the way 
that Stevens exerted policy. One Sierra Leonean commented, "It is too easy for 
any outsider to come to our country and do as he pleases. Politicians always 
assume that the outsider has something for them and, that their people have 
nothing they can offer ... They believe that they can make money with the foreigner 
and nobody else," (Reno, 1995, p.128). 
The diamond industry was not generating enough revenue to support Stevens 
mounting economic needs. For example, Stevens found it hard to service debts 
and to maintain expanding elite accommodation (Reno, 1995). Because their 
tenure in office was often short in duration it was difficult for chosen officials to 
implement policies that would push a development agenda for Sierra Leone (Reno, 
1995). Officials were more concerned with galvanizing as much resources as they 
could than in establishing a loyal constituency, since as favored members of 
Stevens's administration they had access to wealth (Reno, 1995). Therefore, as 
Reno notes bureaucratic institutions became less likely to serve as agents of 
development and to push economic policy that could benefit Sierra Leoneans. 
According to Reno (1995) because of Stevens's policies of elite 
accommodation many politicians were responsible for the economic drain on 
governmental resources. Through privatization diamond revenues went into their 
own private pockets instead of state coffers (Reno, 1995). In addition, monies that 
could have gone to development projects were spent irresponsibly (Reno, 1995). 
For, example in 1980 Stevens spent $200 million dollars hosting the organization 
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of African Unity Conference that was held in Sierra Leone (Reno, 1995). The 
Lebanese benefited from construction contracts that were created as a result of 
Stevens's tenure as host (Reno, 1995). 
As a solution to the fiscal problems that Stevens was experiencing, he 
decided to look to outsiders to help him stabilize the economy in addition to doing 
the most important thing which was to maintain his power. In 1981 the IMF/WB 
loaned the Stevens administration $186 million (Reno, 1995). However, loan 
conditionalities were attached. Because the IMF and the World Bank believe in the 
philosophy of less government and liberalization through privatization, Freetown 
was required to privatize many state-owned enterprises (Reno, 1995). 
Consequently, and in the spirit of maintaining his political hierarchy, Stevens sold 
many enterprises to Lebanese businessmen and their politician partners (Reno, 
1995). 
The Stevens administration and by extension Sierra Leone was 
dependant upon foreigners for the survival of the economy and a level of social 
stability (Reno, 1995). Stevens used the acquired funds received from the IMF and 
the WB to keep in tact political patronage networks (Reno, 1995). He had to turn to 
the Lebanese when the IMF and World Bank called for reforms that consisted of 
privatization. In this sense he became dependant upon the Lebanese to help 
maintain his power (Reno, 1995). Ironically, although Stevens had created a web 
of dependency among his political rivals he himself was dependant upon 
foreigners to maintain power. 
The Lebanese were aware of their economic power. A Lebanese business 
man commented, "Without us this government and country would not last a week," 
(Reno, 1995, p. 150). Another example of the awareness that the Lebanese had of 
their economic stronghold was shown in the fact that when in 1990 a shuttle crash 
killed several Lebanese businessmen, Freetown's Lebanese businesses closed 
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down for several days (Reno, 1995). It came to the point where it was impossible 
to buy much of anything in the city (Reno, 1995). This was an example of the 
economic grip that the Lebanese had been allowed to establish and maintain. 
Privatization mandates did not help to strengthen industries within 
Freetown nor did it satisfy creditor demands. This was due in part to the fact that 
the Lebanese controlled many Freetown industries and were focused on the 
economic maintenance of their own ethnic group instead of the development of 
Sierra Leone (Reno, 1995). One example of this lies in the fact that because 
Lebanese businessmen had access to foreign capital they could import illicit goods 
that legitimate African businessmen could not compete with (Reno, 1995). This 
gave the Lebanese a competitive advantage over many African businesses. 
Additionally, because much of the exports left the country through informal 
channels, which meant that goods were escaping government tax, the government 
did not have the revenue that it needed to offer higher producer prices for exports 
such as those in agriculture (Reno, 1995). Because the government could not raise 
enough revenue from its exports the government therefore did not have sufficient 
resources to pay its creditors. In 1984 the IMF and the World Bank ended credit 
arrangements citing its resentment over the nature of business and government. 
They were by all accounts referring to the relationship between Stevens and the 
Lebanese (Reno, 1995). Consequently, by the end of Stevens's term as president, 
there were numerous economic problems that were left for the new administration 
to haggle with. 
The Political Economy of the Joseph Momoh Administration 1986-1992 
Stevens chosen successor, Joseph Momoh, a former brigadier-general 
came to power in 1986 (Reno, 1995). Momoh inherited many of the problems 
associated with the preceding regime. Although he continued the maintenance of 
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Stevens's elite accommodationist state he did so in a different fashion. Reno 
(1995) notes that Momoh had to meet creditor demands, the needs of the 
populace and also strive to accommodate the elite. 
One of Momoh's first objectives in office was to banish corruption. To 
Momoh, banishing corruption meant banishing Stevens's old elite and the 
Lebanese stronghold on the economy (Reno, 1995). He was able to find somewhat 
of an ally in the IMF. The IMF/World Bank and Momoh's position converged on two 
points which was the economy and politics (Reno, 1995). The IMF and the World 
Bank were more concerned about the Lebanese position in the economy (Reno, 
1995). Momoh was concerned about the Lebanese strong hold on the political 
economy (Reno, 1995). 
Momoh saw the banishment of the Lebanese's stronghold on the political 
economy as key to his political and economic reforms. His strategy for containing 
political adversaries was to cultivate relationships with foreign investors (Reno, 
1995). He worked closest with the IMF and World Bank. The IFls were in favor of 
Momoh's strategies of allying with foreign investors other than the Lebanese 
(Reno, 1995). 
Momoh endeavored on a string of relationships with foreign investors. 
When one relationship failed, he sought out another. This strategy was different 
from that of Stevens, whose principal ally remained the Lebanese throughout his 
term as president (Reno, 1999). 
Momoh held high hopes in LIAT Construction and Finance company 
headed by an Israeli citizen, Shaptai Kalmanowitch (Reno, 1995). In 1986 this 
company assured Momoh that it would increase diamond exports if it was given a 
monopoly over diamond mining (Reno, 1995). If the company was successful, 
Momoh could restrict access to diamond resources while receiving revenue 
benefits from a LIAT dominated diamond trade. This was something to consider 
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since he was interested in marginalizing the power of the Lebanese. 
The venture between Momoh and LIAT was at first highly successful 
(Reno, 1995). The 1986/87 official diamond exports rose over 280 percent of 
1985/86 figures (Reno, 1995). In addition, the Bank of Sierra Leone's holdings 
rose from $196,000 in 1985 to $7.6 million in 1986 (Reno, 1995). Creditors were 
also pleased because Freetown began making payments (Reno, 1995). LIAT had 
also agreed to import rice, a staple food, with foreign exchange collected from the 
sale of diamonds (Reno, 1995). 
In 1987 with the success of LIAT, Momoh introduced PEER, or Public 
Economic Emergency Regulation (Reno, 1995). This program was designed to 
capitalize on what LIA T had accomplished by bringing resources under the control 
of Momoh and to stop informal mining practices of politician elites. In 1987 the 
arrest of Kalmanowitch brought an end to LIA T's involvement in Sierra Leone 
(Reno, 1995). Momoh was left to find another source of foreign investment. This 
left him vulnerable to the Lebanese in that he had to collaborate with them as state 
revenues began to decrease in the absence of LIAT (Reno, 1995). It also made 
African businesses vulnerable because as the government drained local banks for 
credit, African entrepreneurs had to also turn to the Lebanese for loans (Reno, 
1995). 
With this kind of economic decline, World Bank and IMF policies tended to 
make conditions not only harsh for Momoh but mostly harsh for the citizens of 
Sierra Leone. Momoh had to implement austerity measures that had adverse 
impacts upon the people, measures that included a 84.6 percent reduction in 
spending for subsidies, the primary one being rice (Reno, 1995). In addition, 
virtually all expenditures on socially oriented subsidies were cut. 
With all the economic chaos that was occurring, Momoh was steadily losing 
political control and popular support as well. Momoh's strategy was to continue to 
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try to build relationships with foreign investors (Reno, 1995). This would in the long 
run lead to Sierra Leone's economy becoming dependent upon foreign investment. 
In 1988 Momoh embarked on his second PEER program aimed at 
attracting creditor and foreign investor support (Reno, 1995). Within this effort he 
was constantly attempting to banish political and economic opponents which also 
included the Lebanese. 
In 1988, the N.R. SCIPA Group with Israeli investor, Nir Guaz at its head 
established a relationship with Momoh (Reno, 1995). In the beginning the SCIPA 
group provided the president and the economy with modest benefits. For 
example, in 1989 the SCIPA Group provided the government $6 million dollars 
from diamond revenue in addition to 27, 000 tons of imported rice with a promise 
to import at least 80,000 tons in 1990 with revenue earned from diamond exports 
(Reno, 1995). This contribution was not nearly as substantial to that of the 
previous investor, LIAT. Moreover, the relationship came to an abrupt end when 
in 1989 Momoh decided to have Guaz arrested for pursuing economic 
accommodations outside of Momoh's economic interest (Reno, 1995). This left 
Momoh in the difficult position of having to find yet another foreign investor. 
When Guaz was arrested, Momoh was presented with serious financial 
problems that led him to conclude that he needed the assistance of foreign 
investors to make his government operable. There were no foreign firms standing 
in the wings to take Guaz's place. In addition, suppliers no longer extended credit, 
unpaid bills mounted and commerce in general halted (Reno, 1995). Presented 
with these dire circumstances Momoh released Guaz who assisted him in taking 
care of some of the incurred debt (Reno, 1995). 
Momoh was however, not satisfied with the relationship between himself 
and Guaz, therefore he sought to clean up the illicit diamond industry. With this 
decision came his attempts to attract other foreign investors, particularly Sunshine 
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Broulle (Reno, 1995). Sunshine Broulle showed interest in investing in the 
kimberlite diamond industry but was reluctant to do so because they believed that 
Momoh could not control the business activities of Guaz and other accommodated 
elites (Reno, 1995). 
In 1990 Momoh announced his policy of forcible exclusion of the diamond 
mining industry, a measure that finally attracted Sunshine Broulle (Reno, 1995). In 
the same year Sunshine Broulle signed a contract promising an initial $70 million 
dollars in investments to mine in the kimberlite diamond mines. They also provided 
police protection in the diamond mines. 
Momoh's efforts to galvanize foreign investment did not translate into a 
continuous source of revenue to satisfy the needs of his government, the Sierra 
Leonean populace or creditors (Reno, 1995). Consequently, in 1991 the IMF 
proposed RAP, or the Rights Accumulation Program (Reno, 1995). The 
implementation of RAP demonstrated that the IMF had in a sense given up on 
collecting the monies that it was owed and was more concerned about imposing 
discipline to what it saw as a weak government (Reno, 1995). RAP was a program 
of last resort for creditors to collect the debt owed to them. The program was 
designed so that the IMF would approve loans if Momoh demonstrated that he was 
at least making attempts to comply with IMF recommendations, such as having 
revenue collection contracted out to private foreign investors in order to pay debts 
(Reno, 1995). In response to IMF demands, Momoh ounce again went through a 
string of foreign investors in search of revenue. The list of potential foreign 
investors included; Britain's McAllister Ellicott Fisheries, Pioneer Resources NL of 
Australia, and Evergreen (Reno, 1995). 
If debt collectors were becoming tired of making attempts to collect their 
debt, then the Sierra Leonean people were even more exasperated with attempts 
at trying to get the government to provide basic social services. The 1992 over 
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throw of Joseph Momoh led by Valentine Strasser was a demonstration of this 
discontent. Strasser's overthrow of Momoh was reflective of similar objectives of 
the 1991 invasion of the RUF along with Charles Taylor's Liberian army (Reno, 
1995). 
The invasion of Charles Taylor's Liberian army sparked off the civil war in 
Sierra Leone. Segments of the population including business people, the army, 
and ordinary citizens were fed up with the neglect that the government displayed 
towards them. The government was principally concerned with servicing their 
debts and satisfying elite accommodation. Most of the Sierra Leonean population 
was out of sync with both Momoh's and Steven's elite accommodation. However, 
rivals such as Strasser and the RUF were gaining ground as Momoh could not 
eliminate or contain them (Reno, 1995). 
The IMF and the World Bank may have also played a part in aggravating 
the lives of every day citizens through the implementation of structural adjustment. 
Structural adjustment's austerity measures required that subsidies be eliminated 
(Reno, 1995). By 1989/1990 such actions caused petrol to rise 300 percent and 
the price of rice to rise by 180 percent (Reno, 1995). In addition, soldiers were 
dissatisfied because often government officials would pocket monies that were to 
be used for soldier salaries (Reno, 1995). This left many soldiers without pay. 
Many felt that someone should be held accountable. For many, it was the 
government of Sierra Leone itself that was to blame for their problems. 
Many people felt it necessary to lend support to governmental opposition 
factions due to the fact that they felt that the government paid little attention to the 
provision of basic necessities. In their view, the government was responsible for 
their hardships and many aligned with the aims of the opposition forces to achieve 
socio-economic justice (Reno, 1995). 
While Sierra Leonean leaders may have contributed to problems that led 
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to the implementation of structural adjustment programs, the major focus of this 
thesis is to analyze the impact that structural adjustment policies may have had on 
the delivery of social services, specifically, health, education and unemployment. 
Consequently, the role of structural adjustment policies may have led up to the 
discontent that culminated in the civil war from 1991-2000. 
Did the IMF and the World Bank Contribute to Sierra Leone's Economic Problems? 
In essence, although there was growth in the 1960s that was fueled by the 
mining sector and the political ambitions of leaders to control power and wealth, 
the relationship that Sierra Leone began with the IMF and the World Bank came to 
fruition because the economy had in fact began showing signs of decline. The 
decline was paradoxically caused by the same factors that contributed to growth. 
Therefore, the question remains, did the World Bank and the IMF contribute to 
decline, growth or both after establishing itself onto Sierra Leone's economic 
scene? 
Weeks (1992) suggests that the IMF and World Bank's intervention 
contributed to economic decline in Sierra Leone. In addition, he notes that the 
rocky relationship between the International Monetary Fund/ World Bank and 
Sierra Leone began in 1967. However, structural adjustment policies or SAPs 
were created and implemented in the 1980s as a response to economic decline 
that began in the 60s and 70s. One could however argue that the policies that 
begin in 1967 were extremely similar to the SAPs of the 1980s. 
From 1967 to 1977 the conditionality that was imposed by the World 
Bank and the IMF was met and loans were disbursed (Weeks, 1992). By 1981 
the IMF's 3-year loan program began. However, loans were cancelled (Weeks, 
1992). In fact, after 1981 a trend ensued. Loans were either not being disbursed 
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or other negative outcomes occurred. For example, in 1983, 1984 and 1985 no 
loans were disbursed although stipulations for conditions of loans were 
recommended and in some cases implemented (Weeks, 1992). Finally, in 1988 
loans were discontinued altogether (Weeks, 1992). 
What is at issue is the question of whether or not the IMF and the World 
Bank's intervention from 1967 to 1971 contributed to growth, stagnation or both 
within the first decade of independence? This is important to understand because 
the foundation of the economic problems that prevailed in the 1970s and in the 
decades that followed may be linked to the first decade after independence 
(Weeks, 1992). An additional question of relevance is what were the conditions 
that enabled economic growth and stagnation to simultaneously occur up to the 
intervention of the World Bank and the IMF in 1967? 
Reno (1995) has attributed both growth and decline to corruption namely 
the quest of leaders to gain power which includes control over the diamond 
industry. However, Weeks (1992) suggests that after IMF and World Bank 
intervention in 1967 small problems became significantly larger in scope. For 
example, at independence and throughout independence the economy of Sierra 
Leone was based upon the prosperity of the mining sector (Weeks, 1992). 
However, by 1970 diamond exports peaked at 2 million carats as iron ore reached 
a maximum of 2.6 million tons in 1971 (Weeks, 1992). During the 1970s there was 
also a fall in the prices of mineral exports and by 1976, after the multilateral 
intervention the iron ore industry was closed in the same year (Weeks, 1992). 
From 1963-1966 there was apparent growth (Weeks, 1992). However, 
from 1967 to 1969 the rate of growth decreased with a rise in growth only in 1970 
and then another decline in 1971 . The evidence seems to suggest that there was 
more growth in the economy prior to the intervention of the IMF/World Bank that 
began in 1967. However, growth in addition to signs of decline was prevalent 
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during the period between 1961 and 1971. 
In short, Weeks (1992) believes that the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund misdiagnosed Sierra Leone's economic problems by not looking 
at what the country was doing correctly, in terms of its economic policy and by 
not taking into greater account external economic aspects that were beyond 
Sierra Leone's control. In addition, structural adjustment policies tended to 
aggravate rather than alleviate Sierra Leone's economic problems. 
Sierra Leone's Economy: The 1970s and 80s 
Stagnation and decline in the first decade of independence carried over 
into the 1980s. In the years between 1971 and 1981 the pattern of economic 
decline continued and was due in part to the fact that the mining industry declined 
and spread the negative effects throughout the rest of the monetized economy 
(Weeks, 1992). In addition, the rate of growth declined, inflation increased, per 
capita income decreased and the external oil shocks served to have a severe 
impact upon the terms of trade and the stagnation of export markets (Weeks, 
1992). As the world market became more variable, Sierra Leone's economy 
became increasingly vulnerable to economic shocks (Weeks, 1992). 
The external shocks, particularly the oils shocks of the 70s, experienced 
by the economy of Sierra Leone were the major causes of the balance of 
payments problems and Sierra Leone's overall economic collapse (Weeks, 1992). 
Because investments in mineral production and agricultural production had 
declined or had never gotten off of the ground, exports within these sectors were 
impacted by external shocks also (Weeks, 1992). The terms of trade deteriorated 
as mineral and agricultural exports fell (Adepoju, 1993). By the 1980s the 
economy of Sierra Leone had severely went into decline and was in need of 
serious economic restructuring (Weeks, 1992). This is the context in which 
54 
structural adjustment policies were implemented during the mid 1970s and 1980s 
(Weeks, 1992). 
With economic conditions deteriorating in Sierra Leone, the question that 
becomes relevant in terms of the topic of this thesis is what was the impact on the 
delivery of social services? In the next section I discuss the impact of structural 
adjustment policies on key sectors that include health, education and 
employment. 
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Chapter Three 
The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Health, 
Education and Employment 
Perhaps the most significant impact of structural adjustment programs 
was placed upon human interests. The SAPRIN Report (2004) indicates that 
health, education and employment were severely impacted by structural 
adjustment measures. Onimode (1988) adds that structural adjustment policies 
have aggravated and will continue to aggravate sectors such as employment, 
education and health that effect the population by instituting measures such as 
retrenchment in the public sector, subsidy withdrawals and drastic expenditure 
cuts. Additionally, Onimode (1988) notes that the collapse of the welfare state 
through expenditure cuts had created significant problems in health, education 
and other sectors that adversely impacted the population (Onimode, 1988). 
Within this section, I aim to examine the delivery of social services that 
consist of health, education, and employment. Adepoju (1993) maintains that in 
order to assess the impact of structural adjustment policies on social sector 
services the performance criteria that includes; accessibility, acceptability, 
adaptability and affordability should be applied. The author maintains that these 
four performance criteria have not been met in Sierra Leone (1992). 
Magbaily-Fyle (1993) discusses the connection between the efficient 
delivery of social services and the benefits in terms of the well being or stability of 
a given government. He further gives the definition of social services as elements 
that help to facilitate the accumulation of wealth and the generation of economic 
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development in a state (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). Such elements will_incorporate 
services that include functional education and healthcare facilities including 
primary healthcare (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). Further, the provision of such services 
for economic development also reinforces the legitimacy and stability of the 
government (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
Sierra Leone has experienced a decline in the provision of the delivery of 
social services by the government. As a consequence the government has lost 
much of its stability and legitimacy (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). Structural adjustment 
policies may have had an impact on the inability of the government to provide 
social services. 
In a study completed by Dr. Juliet A. Melville (2002) on the impact of 
structural adjustment on the poor, she notes some key findings pertaining to the 
general impact that structural adjustment has had on the poor in terms of the 
provision of social services. In her study she seeks to understand how specific 
adjustment measures impacted poverty? Her findings shows that the allocation of 
social service provisions such as health and employment were severely impacted 
and that poverty was therefore increased. 
Although there are numerous social services that can be discussed, 
I focus on the delivery of health, education and employment. I will discuss how 
structural adjustment policies may have had an adverse impact on the decline in 
the delivery of these services. Using empirical data I, discuss the decades of the 
1960s, 70s and 80s. 
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During the 1960s and 70s growth was apparent within Sierra Leone, 
however in the 1980s the economy went into severe decline. As previously 
discussed, during the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank began extensive involvement in the economy of Sierra Leone. Gains that 
occurred in the 60s and 70s in health, education and employment were severely 
weakened by the 1980s. The liberalization of the economy and the removal of 
price controls in addition to other structural adjustment policies may have 
negatively impacted the delivery of health, education and employment in the 
1980s. 
For the purposes of this discussion it is of importance to note some key 
demographic features of Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone has four major 
administrative units (Magbaily- Fyle, 1993). They consist of the Western Area, 
the Southern Province, Eastern Province and the Northern Province. Each 
Province is divided into 12 districts which are further divided into 184 chiefdoms 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). Districts are administratively headed by government 
officials called district officers, who supervise the day to day administration of 
paramount chiefs in charge of chiefdoms. 
The paramount chiefs are representative of the traditional authority 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). The Provinces have provincial headquarters and each 
headquarter has a town council responsible for the provision of basic social 
services (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). The Western Area is divided into four small rural 
districts and Freetown. Its local government includes the Freetown City Council 
and the Rural Area Committees for the provision of social services (Magbaily-
Fyle, 1993). 
How has Sierra Leone fared under structural adjustment in terms of 
health, education and employment in comparison to other African countries? In a 
report on the impact of structural adjustment in African countries, Naiman and 
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Watkins (1999) conclude that most African countries did not fare well under 
adjustment. Particularly they note that health, education and employment declined 
in many countries during the period of structural adjustment. 
Zimbabwe was unlike Sierra Leone in that structural adjustment was not 
instituted due to a crisis, rather Zimbabwe turned to the IMF in 1991 to undertake 
structural adjustment after several years of economic stagnation (Naiman and 
Watkins, 1999). Zimbabwe took this measure in hopes of reviving economic 
growth (Naiman and Watkins, 1999). However, just as in Sierra Leone, so it was 
the case in Zimbabwe that under adjustment the health sector declined. In 
Zimbabwe the IMF called for reductions in the real wages of public health care 
workers (Naiman and Watkins, 1999). In addition, as a result of wage cuts 
doctors began moving towards the private sector and health care became more 
inaccessible especially to the poor who could not pay. Just as in Sierra Leone, in 
pre-adjustment years health care was made accessible to all Zimbabweans. 
However, as was the case in Sierra Leone so it was in Zimbabwe that adjustment 
came with severe cuts that created inaccessibility to health care. 
In Zimbabwe government spending on education also fell during 
adjustment. Government expenditure on primary and secondary education 
declined by 36 percent between 1990 and 1991 and by 25 percent between 1993 
and 1994 (Naiman and Watkins, 1999). Teacher and educational staff wages fell 
by 26 percent in 1990 and 43 percent in 1993 (Naiman and Watkins, 1999). 
Cote d'Ivoire, which became involved with the IMF in 1989, shared a 
similar fate under adjustment as Sierra Leone in terms of health, education and 
employment. For example between 1990 and 1995 real per capita spending on 
health care fell and education spending fell dramatically (Naiman and Watkins, 
1999). Between 1990 and 1995 education spending declined by more that 35 
percent (Naiman and Watkins, 1999). Reductions in the wages of civil service 
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workers that was called for by the IMF had the effect of lowering teacher and 
health workers salaries (Naiman and Watkins, 1999). This caused the delivery of 
educational and health services to decline. 
Naiman and Watkins (1999) found that Uganda, a model for the success 
of adjustment programs did not fare well under adjustment in terms of health, 
education and employment. Similar to Sierra Leone, Uganda's economy was in 
severe decline when the IMF came on the scene in 1987 (Naiman and Watkins, 
1999). One of the main similarities between Uganda and Sierra Leone is the 
impact of cost sharing. Cost sharing was a measure that was widely instituted in 
Uganda under structural adjustment (Naiman and Watkins, 1999). In both 
countries cost sharing has led to the closure of many hospitals. It has driven 
doctors into private practice and created a situation where if one cannot pay one 
also cannot receive medical services. Cost sharing in both countries has led to 
less access to health and educational services. 
Now that the discussion on how and why structural adjustment policies 
were implemented in Sierra Leone in addition to comparing Sierra Leone to other 
adjusting countries has been presented, the following section will discuss the 
impact that SAPs have had on the delivery of health, education and employment. 
Health 
The government of Sierra Leone made numerous attempts to address the 
provision of the delivery of health care. The Sierra Leonean government took 
over the responsibility of providing health care as a social service provision to its 
population from the colonial government at independence (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
From the 1950s onward there has been a minister responsible for health policy in 
addition to an administrative branch attached to the Ministry of Health ( Magbaily-
Fyle, 1993). There has also been a chief medical advisor responsible for advising 
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the Minister of Health on all health related matters (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
The Sierra Leonean government demonstrated that it was really serious 
about the provision of health services for the population when in 1962 the 
government prepared a ten year plan for the allocation of healthcare services 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). Although comprehensive, the plan was viewed as too 
ambitious because it would require much aid from the international community 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). Consequently, this plan was modified in 1965 and called 
The National Health Plan 1965-1975 (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). Most of the 
healthcare initiatives in the 1970s took its direction from this document. One such 
example was the 197 4-75 National Development Plan (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
In assessing the government's lofty goals in the establishment of quality 
healthcare, the question of how was the government to pay for these services 
arises? To finance health care the government set aside revenue in its budget to 
provide funding for these services. Much of the funding came from foreign 
sources as well as from export revenues from its mining and agricultural sectors 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). However, as the terms of trade declined during the oil 
shocks of the 1970s and as structural adjustment policies were instituted the 
healthcare sector declined (Omnimode, 1988;, Adepoju, 1992;, Weeks 1992;, 
SAPRIN, 2004). 
Goals for the Allocation of Health Care in the 1970s 
In the 1970s the evidence suggests that the government of Sierra Leone 
had a strong desire to improve the allocation of the delivery of health services. In 
fact, the National Development Plan healthcare component for 197 4-1975 to 
1978-1979 mission was as follows. 
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'The Health Strategy adopted by the government is to raise the level of health of 
all people by providing a network of sound health facilities capable of reducing 
diseases, protecting life, increasing productivity, and ultimately promoting well-
being in the shortest possible time" (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
The strategies included: 
Combating major communicable diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and 
leprosy. 
Reduction in maternal and infant mortality by strengthening and extending the 
maternal, child and school health services. 
Expansion of medical and healthcare facilities in order to reach a greater 
percentage of the population. 
Health education. 
Provision of qualified staff to service the facilities and the provision of health 
statistics as well as laboratory facilities . (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993) 
Goals for the Allocation of Health Care in the 1980s 
The government established a plan of action to provide better health care 
for its people. The Second National Health Plan of 1981-82 to 1985-86 made the 
following declarations in regards to health care: 
'The government of Sierra Leone is committed to the world-wide goal to achieve 
health for all by the year 2000 and has endorsed the resolutions of the World 
Wide Health Organization member states in the Alma-Ata Conference on Primary 
Health Care, and the United Nations Water Conference at Mal Del Plata, 
Argentina, which designed the period 1981-90 as the International Drinking 
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Water Supply and Sanitation Decade," (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993 p10). 
The following are proposed strategies for achieving goals as outlined in the 
Health Sector Plan that was apart of the Second National Development Plan: 
1. Providing a network of sound health services appropriately staffed and 
logistically functional, comprehensively managed and assessable to all citizens 
and residents of Sierra Leone. 
2. Protecting Sierra Leoneans from environmental health hazards and 
communicable diseases by means of strengthening health legislation and public 
health services. 
3. Promoting better health of the population by means of community participation 
and inter-sectoral co-operation in accordance with the Primary Health Care 
concept (PHC) (WHO, 1984:10). 
4. In concretizing these projects the government has focused on the provision of 
rural based medical facilities with the aim of preventing the spread of malaria, 
tuberculosis, leprosy, measles and other such ailments by extending Endemic 
Control Units to the district level. 
5. Reducing infant mortality rates by strengthening maternal and other child 
health care. 
6. Building a network of rural health centers and improving existing units. 
Increasing the country's training capacity. Sources: The Provision of Social Service in 
Sierra Leone, Magbaily-Fyle, 1993;, The Impact of Structural Adjustment on the Population of 
Africa, Adepoju, 1993. 
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In the 1980s the government implemented World Bank I IMF sponsored 
structural adjustment programs which were conditions attached to loans. 
Although the government had plans to strengthen health care in the 1980s the 
conditionalites imposed by structural adjustment policies severely hampered their 
efforts. 
Despite the government having commendable goals for improving health 
care, budgetary constraints had in fact reduced the availability of resources for 
the health sector (Adepoju, 1993). Health care declined within the 1980s from its 
previous years (Adepoju, 1993;, Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). Figure 1 on the following 
page denotes the impact that structural adjustment may have had on the 
allocation of health. 
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Figure 1 : The State of Healthcare Allocation in Sierra Leone 
Prjmary Source · Percentages and values derived from Magbaily-Eyle. 1993. 
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During the 1960s the annual budget percentage of total governmental 
expenditure allocated for health was 36. 1 while in the 1970s it was 38.2 percent. 
However, we see a decline in the 1980s to 38.1 percent for health care. It was in 
the 1980s that structural adjustment policies called for cuts in social spending. As 
figure 1 shows spending on health care declined. 
The impact in the decline in expenditures on health care can be seen in 
the decline of opened hospitals. In the 1960s there were 7 hospitals. That 
number peaked at 90 in the 1970s and dropped to 58 by the 1980s. The 
constraints were that there was not enough money being allocated in the budget 
to pay for the provision of health services. 
While there was a huge increase in the number of doctors or general 
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practitioners in the 1980s (see figure 1) as compared to the 1960s and 1970s, 
accessibility to healthcare declined. When the state budget cut expenditures for 
the health sector, doctors were as a result poorly paid and began using 
government hospital facilities and working time for their own private practice 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). Many government hospital beds carried private pay 
patients and those who could not afford to tip a doctor or a nurse received scant 
medical attention if any at all (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). This was a drastic departure 
from the preceding decades where government healthcare was practically free 
(Adepoju, 1993). 
In the 1980s fees started to be imposed for many medical services and 
those who could not pay did not receive services (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). This was 
a consequence of the fact that medical services had been cut to the barest 
minimum in both urban and rural areas, although urban areas received most of 
health services offered (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). The uneven distribution of health 
resources created a situation where the urbanites who comprised only 24.5 
percent of the population (rural 77 percent) received the majority of services. 
However, services were by no means adequate in urban areas. 
As the effectiveness of health allocation declined, people became more 
vulnerable to health problems. For example, although the extended program of 
immunization was aimed principally at protecting women and infants, a 1984 
effectiveness survey revealed that only 15 percent of those under the age of 5 
were fully immunized (Adepoju, 1993). In addition, the over- concentration of 
medical personnel in urban areas worked to the detriment of those that resided in 
rural areas. This was due to a lack of funding that would allow mobile clinics to 
serve the rural areas at an adequate level (Adepoju, 1993). 
Although there is no clear data on the decline of Alternative Health Care 
Facilities during structural adjustment there seems to have been less access to 
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health services available at these alternative facilities during structural 
adjustment. Alternative Health Care Centers included dispensaries, Health 
Centers, Treatment Centers and Maternal and Child Health Care Clinics. These 
facilities were used in the event that a person was unable to obtain access to 
hospital services (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). People could get treatment for minor 
and major medical needs such as for cuts, burns and pre-natal care (Magbaily-
Fyle, 1993). Alternative Health Care Centers were a vital part of the health care 
structure. 
However, by 1989 the death rate was 24 per 1000, infant mortality was 
160 per 1000 live births and life expectancy was only 40 for both sexes. In fact, 
by 1991 Sierra Leone was labeled one of the countries with the worst quality of 
life and among those with the poorest health services in the world (Magbaily-
Fyle, 1993). 
Notwithstanding a lack of attention from medical personnel, much of the 
medical problems that occurred were due to a lack of drugs. During the 1980s 
many cases were reported in the local papers of sick people dying in local 
hospitals for want of drugs or medical attention (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). One of the 
major causes of these problems was that people could not afford to pay for drugs 
and hospital care. The implementation of the cost-recovery system that took root 
in 1986 contributed greatly to these problems ( Adepoju, 1993). Prior to the 
emergence of cost recovery programs, medical services and drugs were 
provided almost free of charge. For example, prescription drugs were priced at 
40 cents per patient (Adepoju, 1993). The price of prescription drugs escalated 
after 1987 making it nearly impossible for people, especially the rural community 
to be able to make use of them (Adepoju, 1993). As Adepoju (1993) notes most 
indicators point to the deterioration of health systems while carrying out 
adjustment. 
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Education 
The Philosophies and Goals of Education in the 1960s and 70s 
Sierra Leone has since independence been concerned with improving 
education. Education figured into expansionist policies in terms of the 
development of Sierra Leone (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). The government was much 
concerned with expanding education to all segments of the population. This was 
due in large part to the fact that the government recognized the role of education 
in achieving economic and social progress as did many other countries 
throughout Africa ( Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
In 1961, the Ministers of Education held a conference at Addis Ababa 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1993;, Adepoju, 1993). At this conference they discussed their 
basic goals and philosophies on education and how it could be improved in the 
years to come. One of the major goals was that primary compulsory education 
should become free to all by 1980 (Adepoju, 1993;, Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). In 
addition, they agreed that secondary education should be available to at least 1 /3 
of those children who complete primary school. 
The government felt that it was very important to Africanize education 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). To Africanize education was to make educational 
experiences conductive to the economic and social needs of the country 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). This was to be accomplished through designing a 
curriculum with programs of study that would be appropriately reflective of the 
realities of Sierra Leonean society (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). This meant that careful 
attention would be paid to the local needs and life patterns of Sierra Leoneans for 
the eventual integration into the school system (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
Consequently, two of the most important areas where this integration would be 
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applied were in the areas of development and agriculture (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
The government achieved this in a number of ways. As apart of the 
education agenda designed for the period between 1964 and 1970, the 
government implemented trade school programs located in rural areas that 
focused on especially agricultural education (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). This was 
done in response to the disparity in regards to the access and allocation of 
education in the rural areas versus the urban areas. For example in this period 
80 percent of educational services and facilities were biased in favor of urban 
areas with only 6 percent going to rural areas (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
The focus on agriculture was a reflection of a philosophy of self-reliance 
especially in the areas of food sufficiency (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
Recommendations for education in agriculture meant in effect an awareness of 
the need to be progressive in food self sufficiency for the country as a whole 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). It also meant that the government recognized the 
importance of the rural community as relevant to this process. 
The modernization of education was something that the government 
wanted to improve. The government wanted to keep up with the modern 
technological advances of the developed nations (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). In an 
effort to do so, the government stressed that there was a need to use such 
equipment as tape recorders, films, film projectors, and other audio-visual aids to 
enhance teaching methods (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
The government was also concerned with centralizing education. The 1964 
Education Act was geared towards empowering the state to carry out the main 
functions of the provision of education (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). The Minister of 
Education was to handle tasks such as the establishment of new institutions, 
curriculum development and reform, appointments to board of governors and 
school fee rates (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
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During the 1970s the government began to reflect on strengths and 
weaknesses associated with the educational system in terms of educational 
policy and practice at the beginning of the 1960s (Magbaily- Fyfe, 1993). This 
meant that the government was to focus on whether or not expansion in 
education proved to have a qualitative balance. More emphasis was placed on 
quality of education although the government still paid special attention to access 
as well (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). The 1970 Government White Paper on Education 
espoused concern for quality through policies such as priority attention to 
improvements in primary education, development and improvement of the 
professional standards of teachers, special training of graduate teachers to teach 
in the primary education field, consolidation rather than expansion of secondary 
education and proper educational planning (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
Universal access to education also continued to be a theme of importance 
in the 1970s. This tended to focus more so on the rural sector. The 197 4 Sierra 
Leone Review Conference questioned the relevance of education especially in 
the rural areas in terms of the returns on educational access in these regions as 
juxtaposed to costs (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). The evidence shows that in the 1960s 
and 70s the government sought to expand and to improve access to education in 
addition to improving the quality of education. 
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Education in the 1980s 
In the 1980s the objective, and philosophy of the government 
did not change, however, the situation of the economy changed within 
this period (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). This was largely due to the 
deterioration of world economic conditions that were beyond the control 
of Sierra Leone (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). The shift in the philosophy of 
education changed considerably in the 1980s. The new thinking fell in 
line with ideals espoused by the IMF and World Bank such as 
liberalization, privatization and efficiency. In the 1980s this school of 
thought emphasized the maximization of scarce resources and the 
notion of functionalism (Magbaily - Fyle, 1993). 
The concept of functional education had never been so 
dominant since the attainment of independence (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
The underlying rationale of functional education is that the cost of 
services could be greatly reduced at no expense to quality and efficiency 
if more attention was paid to relevance, productivity and output 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). This philosophy was not well suited to the 
expansionist policies that were established in the 1960s and 70s and as 
a result, by the 1980s the quality and quantity of education began to 
falter (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
As educational quality and quantity declined the community and 
others began to play more of an active role in the allocation of education. 
The government's previous central role was minimized thereby reducing 
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the centralization of education into the hands of the government 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
Figure 2: A Comparison of Education 1960-1980 
Primar Source: Percentages and values derived from Magbaily-Fyle, 1993 
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From 1973 to 1980 (see Figure 2) there was an upward trend in 
educational expenditure that reached its peak between 1983 and 1984. From 
1973- 1974 expenditure on education was 15,420 (000 leones). From 1976-1977 
educational expenditure was 28,404 (000 leones). By 1984 educational 
expenditure was at 79,013.3 (000 leones). Clearly, over time there was an 
upward trend in the amount of money allocated in the budget for education. 
However after 1984 educational spending fell far below previous spending. 
As the 1980s progressed the allocation in the budget towards education 
declined. In 1987 the expenditure allocation to education was reduced by 50 
percent due to cuts that were called for by structural adjustment policies 
(Adepoju, 1993). From 1989 to 1990 educational expenditure was less than 2.5 
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percent of the budget (Adepoju, 1993). For example, Figure 2 indicates that by 
1984 spending on teacher education drastically decreased to 26.5 (000 leones) 
from a high of 215. 0 (000 leones) during the years between 1973 and 1974. It is 
barely possible to carry out high educational standards if the teachers 
themselves are not adequately educated. 
Teachers, one of the single most important actors in the quality and 
expansion of education were probably hit the hardest by the budget cuts in the 
1980s. In the 1960s and 70s major government incentives were designed to 
attract and retain quality teachers (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). For example, during the 
1960s the non-contributory pension, in the 1970s the introduction of study leave 
with pay for unqualified teachers and special allowances for science teachers 
were created to retain quality teachers (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). However, by the 
1980s the latter developments were adversely impacted and could barely be 
sustained (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
According to Adepoju (1993), stabilization measures have had a further 
devastating effect on education. Austerity measures have brought more 
concentration of qualified teachers in urban areas while rural areas suffer from a 
lack of qualified teachers in their communities (Adepoju, 1993). Hidden costs 
such as the cost of textbooks and other essential materials have been born by 
many parents who could not afford such items at the primary and secondary 
levels of education (Adepoju, 1993). Education is a quasi-public good to the 
extent that it provides benefits to the individual as well as to the society at large 
(Adepoju, 1993). However, education's benefits to the society of Sierra Leone 
may have been adversely impacted as a result of the implementation of structural 
adjustment policies. 
During the third decade of independence, teachers began leaving the 
profession at an unprecedented rate (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). This was due to low 
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salaries that came as a result of budget cuts (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). Teachers in 
rural areas bore most of the burden of these cuts. Magbaily-Fyle (1993) notes 
that these problems have significantly affected the supply and moral of qualified 
teachers and has therefore reduced teacher output and student performance. 
The debt crisis that was heightened in the 1980s has created a trend 
where during this period the teaching profession had become increasingly 
unattractive (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). Budgetary cuts created a situation in which 
teachers constituted one of the lowest priorities for salary repayment (Magbaily-
Fyle, 1993). 
As a result of the difficulties that teachers faced in terms of the salaries 
they earned, teachers supplemented their incomes by taking on teaching jobs for 
non-governmental organizations (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). This has had a negative 
impact, particularly in the rural areas where problems of overcrowded classrooms 
and a lack of instructional materials were due to the reduction in real terms of 
educational subsidies to schools (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993 ). 
School subsidies and subventions suffered a huge blow during the period 
of structural adjustment. Figure 2 indicates that from 1973-1980 there was an 
upward trend in the budgetary allocation of subsidies and subventions. From 
1973-1974 the allocation was 3,235.4 (000 leones). From 1976-1977 the 
allocation was 5,112.3 (000 leones). From 1979-1980 the allocation was 6,330.7 
(000 leones). However, by 1984 the allocation had been drastically reduced to 
12.4 (000 leones). Without educational subsidies it became impossible for many 
to attend school. 
When budgetary cuts were implemented in the 1980s, many educational 
and supplemental programs have either been reduced or cut all together. For 
example, in 1983 the policy to improve primary education and provide learning 
materials reached implementation as apart of the Third Sierra Leone Education 
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Project (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). However, by 1987 when the government failed to 
meet the payments deadline for a proportion of its debt with the IMF and World 
Bank, the project was abandoned all together ( Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
Yet another example is the Audio-Visual Center that was established in 
the 1960s with the aim of providing a more technologically oriented educational 
atmosphere (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993 ). In the 1970s the center began to falter as it 
needed new equipment and had other maintenance costs (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
By the 1980s courses were no longer taught and teachers no longer brought 
students to the center (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
In the 1960s_educational publications were established with the objective 
of providing teachers and students with a full range of written materials relevant 
to their culture and also to disseminate to the wider Sierra Leonean public 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). With publication beginning in 1963, publication branches 
produced teachers' guides, a handbook of suggestions for primary school 
teachers and guidelines for teaching economics and science (Magabily-Fyle, 
1993). In addition, regular editions of The Sierra Leone Journal of Education 
were produced. The government took responsibility for production costs. By 
1982, production of The Sierra Leone Journal of Education had ceased 
publishing (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
Enrollment during the 1980s did not decline, however, spending per 
student did in fact decline. In the 1980s student spending declined by 84 percent 
at the primary and secondary level and 94 percent at the technical school level 
(Adepoju, 1993). In effect, while the infrastructure for education was present, the 
capacity to teach and reach those whom the institutions were created for 
severely declined within this period. Consequently, how can one learn without a 
teacher, and an adequately qualified teacher at that? 
Immediately after independence the government of Sierra Leone had high hopes 
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supported by an agenda and a philosophy in terms of expanding quality 
education. This continued into the 1970s and 80s. However, in the 1980s the 
economy and external factors made it difficult to attain set goals, carry out the 
philosophy in education and capitalize on previous gains made in education. This 
difficulty came largely as a result of budgetary cuts called for by structural 
adjustment policies to the provision of education (Magbaily-Fyle, 1993). 
Education and employment, particularly in the modern world, were impacted one 
by the other. The next section discusses the impact that structural adjustment 
may have had on the provision of employment in Sierra Leone. 
Employment 
Although the evidence on employment records are scanty in Sierra Leone, 
Adepoju (1993) has attested to the fact that structural adjustment programs have 
caused employment problems that were great in stature. Similarly, Onimode 
(1988) shares this sentiment. Onimode has suggested that one of the negative 
outcomes of structural adjustment policies has been to undermine and weaken 
the working class through wage freezes and reduction of real wages, thus 
redistributing income and wealth in favor of both local and multilateral capital in 
the construction of global capitalism. Additionally, a report entitled, Adjustment, 
Employment and Labor Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa (1997), notes 
that structural adjustment programs have had an adverse impact on labor and 
employment across the African continent. 
The SAPRIN Report (2004) suggests that under structural adjustment, 
labor has often been increasingly undervalued and gives theoretical insight into 
the nature of creating wealth through labor. Wealth in any region of the world is 
generated by the labor of human beings and as such, without their labor there is 
no income. Without labor, neither production, distribution of wealth nor markets 
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could exist (SAPRIN, Report, 2004). 
Humanity employs labor in numerous ways. In developed countries 
wherein the relationship between supply and demand is clear, work is usually 
compensated for through salaries (SAPRIN Report, 2004). In developing 
countries this is often not the case, however, the labor market exists with many 
types of employment and workers (SAPRIN Report, 2004). 
With the emergence of structural adjustment in developing countries, labor 
has been reduced to supply and demand, cutting many work activities that are 
necessary for production and wealth creation in human society, out side of 
economic considerations (SAPRIN Report, 2004). In structural adjustment terms 
labor has been defined in terms of productivity and effectiveness of the individual. 
This has in effect given little regard for work that involves the collective (SAPRIN, 
Report, 2004). 
The SAPRIN Report (2004) provides useful insight as to what the nature 
of employment entails. First, employment is a function of the level and structure of 
economic activity and productivity. According to the SAPRIN Report (2004) the 
nature of work also consists of the following. 
1. An increase in demand for goods and services tend to increase a sector's 
economic activity. With constant levels of productivity, if this demand is not met by 
imports, employment rises. In effect, in order to produce more, additional labor is 
needed, whether by increasing time worked by those already employed or by 
adding new workers. 
2. If demand increases as a result of net increases in those productive sectors 
requiring little labor per unit of capital, accompanied by decreases in highly labor-
intensive sectors, then, even when production increases, employment declines. 
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3. Increased productivity has a double-edged effect : it directly results in 
technological unemployment (substitution of workers by technological 
modernization), but also indirectly generates employment linked to the new 
technologies and provides a stimulus to produce that will in turn generate new 
jobs. 
4. Just as production and productivity depend on an economy's overall functioning 
and its relationship to the rest of the world, in much the same way employment's 
behavior is linked to the entire economy's performance and the primary economic 
strategies promoted by public policy. As a result, the effects of structural 
adjustment on employment depends on labor market policies, the economy's 
evolution, the restructuring of its productive apparatus and the effects this 
generates in terms of overall changes in employment patterns. 
The impact that structural adjustment has had on wages has been in the 
areas of the reduction of wages and in terms of items such as salary costs. 
Reduction of wages was designed to contain inflation and production costs and 
in so doing allow a country to achieve competitiveness on the world market 
(SAPRIN Report, 2004). This measure has tended to hurt all classes including 
those in both urban and rural areas through losses in terms of job stability, real 
wages and living standards (SAPRIN Report, 2004). 
I have thus far noted some generalities in terms of the impact that 
structural adjustment tends to have on employment in developing countries. In the 
next sections, I will discuss the Sierra Leonean case since, Sierra Leone may 
have no less been subjected to the negative impacts of adjustment in terms of 
employment faced by other African countries and parts of the developing world. 
Because the data on employment in Sierra Leone is scanty for the first decade of 
independence, I discuss the 1970s and 80s only. 
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Employment in Urban Areas: 1970s 
It is worth noting that figures on employment data in the 1970s are scanty 
and could have been undercounted. This is because the number of many workers 
may not have been counted in the Labor Exchange Records, since it only 
recorded establishments with six or more workers (Magbaily-Fyle, 1988). The 
1974 census figure puts the number of employed workers at 1,009,872 (Magbaily-
Fyle, 1988 ). Of these workers at least 30 out of 100 were un- paid house hold 
workers who as a result of their contribution received food and shelter (Magbaily-
Fyle, 1988). 
In the 1970s unemployment was not reasonably high. For example in 
1977, 6,832 workers registered themselves as unemployed with the Labor 
Exchange and in 1979 5,004 people registered as unemployed (Magbaily-Fyle, 
1988). Apart from the Labor Exchange, more detailed figures are available from 
the Port Loko and Bombali Districts for 1977 (Magbaily-Fyle, 1988). 
In the Bombali and Port Loko districts over 50 percent of the labor force 
were employed (Magbaily-Fyle, 1988 ). Of those that were not employed in Port 
Loko over 40 percent were attending school (Magbaily-Fyle, 1988 ). The 
population of Bombali was at 14,372 while Port Loko was at 10, 228 in 1974 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1988). In 1977 the population within these districts must not have 
increased by huge numbers. In addition, the total population within these districts 
were not all urban as the majority lived in the rural areas (Magbaily-Fyle, 1988). 
Therefore, it is again reasonable to assert that unemployment was not reasonably 
high. Additionally, unemployment did not appear to be a serious problem in urban 
areas including those outside of Freetown (Magbaily-Fyle, 1988). 
In order to get an understanding of the level of income of the urban 
workers we can look to the small scale studies that Magbaily-Fyle (1988) has 
discussed. First, during the 1970s an urban area was defined as having 2,000 or 
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more people living within the confines of the specified urban area (Magbaily-Fyle, 
1988). A sample study of 1000 small scale businesses such as tailoring, retail 
trade and vehicle repair were taken in 1976 in Freetown (Magbaily-Fyle, 1988). 
There were usually two workers to each business with an average pay of 20 
leones per month. At least half were employed full time and received 20 leones. 
The remaining workers who were non- wage and part-time workers did not 
receive the 20 leones. They instead received food, shelter and some training as 
payment. Real wages for other workers such as cooks, stewards, cleaners, 
security guards and porters, ranged from 65 leones to 75 leones per month with 
wages varying with the public and private sector. Wages for skilled workers were 
a bit higher at an average of 85 to 100 leones per month. Clerical worker received 
an average of 80 leones per month. At least 40 percent of those employed in 
urban areas including Freetown worked in one of the aforementioned jobs 
(Magbaily-Fyle, 1988). 
Employment in Rural Areas 
In rural areas Magbaily-Fyle (1988) notes that there was really no such 
thing as unemployment because the population was primarily engaged in 
subsistence agriculture. In 197 4 in the whole of the country over two-thirds of the 
labor force, those 12 and over, were engaged in the work of agriculture (Magbaily-
Fyle, 1988). The total farming labor force in Sierra Leone in 1974 was 697,448 
people (Magbaily-Fyle, 1988). Of these over 45 percent were self-employed and 
another 45 percent were unpaid household workers. Those who were among the 
ranks of the unemployed, were unemployed as a result of either attending school, 
old age or sickness (Magbaily-Fyle, 1988). 
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Employment Problems in the 1980s 
Unemployment within the urban sector was the sector that may have been 
the most severely impacted by structural adjustment since the population in the 
rural areas did not necessarily participate in wage labor (Adepoju, 1993). In 
addition, the urban population bore the burden of over crowdedness due to rural 
migration. Rural migration not only intensified the urban unemployment problem, it 
also caused severe shortages in food (Adepoju, 1993). Structural adjustment cuts 
that called for the elimination of subsidies including food failed to make a bad 
situation better (Adepoju, 1993). 
The wage earning class within the urban sector lost real incomes to a 
devastating degree (Weeks, 1992). In fact, Weeks (1992) in his book, 
Development Strategy and the_Economy of Sierra Leone, dealt with the impact 
that World Bank and IMF polices as implemented through structural adjustment 
had on the incomes of both rural and urban Sierra Leoneans. First, by declaring 
that there was a significant gap in rural and urban incomes the World Bank has 
helped to contribute to increased poverty (Weeks, 1992). As a consequence of 
this declaration SAPs called for a redistribution of income away from wage 
earners that principally resided in urban areas (Weeks, 1992). This was a mistake 
because the gap between rural and urban income was never significantly wide. 
This, in addition to the fact that after the early 1970s wage incomes dropped so 
low as compared to farm incomes, that in the mid 1980s the average farm income 
was far above that of the urban income (Weeks, 1992). 
Wage incomes of urban families were so far below the national average 
that any redistribution away from urban incomes would in fact cause urbanites to 
plunge deeper into poverty (Weeks, 1992). In 1983 structural adjustment 
programs were designed to shift the terms of trade in favor of agriculture which 
include policies such as massive exchange rate devaluation (Weeks, 1992). This 
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led to increased average farm income but caused severe income inequality that 
worsened the plight of the urban poor (Weeks, 1992). Based upon the available 
evidence, the misdiagnosis of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund in terms of their implementation of structural adjustment policies, contributed 
more to unemployment and poverty than it did to the alleviation of unemployment 
and poverty (Weeks, 1992). 
Many people have attributed the loss of employment opportunities 
particularly in urban areas as a major causal factor leading up to the beginning of 
the civil war that occurred between 1991 and 2000. Upon interviewing men and 
women in Sierra Leone as to the cause of the war Fouke-Mpoyo (2004) noted that 
numerous respondents believe unemployment caused many hardships that led to 
frustration. For example, a chief in the Koinadugu district commented," There was 
no food and massive unemployment, even the educated had no jobs. Their best 
job was to go into armed robbery. They were easily conscripted into armed 
movements (Fouke-Mpoyo, p1, 2002). Similarly, The International Labor 
Organization Magazine in its February 2000 issue noted that poverty and 
unemployment were important reasons as to why the civil war took place. In 
addition, it noted that with 70 percent unemployed and closure of the majority of 
industries in addition to thousands of workers being laid off, it is not difficult to 
understand why the civil war took place. 
While this chapter has discussed how structural adjustment may have 
contributed adversely to health, education and employment, the next chapter in 
many ways continues this discussion. The next chapter discusses how structural 
adjustment policies may have had an impact on the civil war in Sierra Leone that 
occurred between 1991 and 2000. The major point that the final chapter attempts 
to convey is that the impact that SAPs may have had on health, education and 
employment contributed to frustration that has in fact led to civil war. 
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Chapter Four 
Conclusion: The Impacts of Structural Adjustment on 
the Civil War in Sierra Leone 
As discussed in the previous chapters, Sierra Leone has been 
experiencing a number of economic problems since independence. The decline 
of the economy began in the 1960s and as the decades proceeded the economic 
situation became worse. One factor that may have significantly contributed to the 
further decline of Sierra Leone's economic situation was the introduction and 
implementation of neo-classily driven structural adjustment policies. These 
policies were prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
as a corrective to the economic problems that persisted in Africa. This final 
chapter argues that structural adjustment policies in the case of Sierra Leone 
may have contributed to economic decline that led to civil conflict. 
In essence, the neo-classical theory of economics that underpins structural 
adjustment policies, tended to lead to socio-economic problems that persisted in 
the 1970s and 80s. In the next sections I will discuss the civil war that occurred 
between 1991 and 2000. I will then argue that structural adjustment policies may 
have contributed to the soci-economic conflict that culminated into civil war. 
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The Civil War in Sierra Leone 1991-2000: A Brief Background 
The civil war in Sierra Leone was a war between the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh, and the government of Sierra Leone 
(Clapham, 2003). Segments within the RUF came from the ranks of 
disadvantaged intellectuals who felt that they were essentially getting less than 
they deserved both economically and socially (Clapham, 2003). The segments of 
dissidents also included factions of the military, students, the rural and urban 
poor, and the youth (Clapham, 2003). The .leaders of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, 
along with members of the Liberian army, sparked the war by moving into eastern 
Kailahun in March of 1991 (Richards, 2003). From March of 1991 until the year 
2000 the small country was engrossed in civil war. As noted earlier, the reasons 
for this war lay in the context of frustration created by economic constraints that 
adversely impacted the population in Sierra Leone. 
Structural Adjustment Policies and the Civil War In Sierra Leone 
Many scholars hold the view that internal factors were the main culprit for 
the civil war that broke out in Sierra Leone. (Zack-Williams, 1999;, Clapham, 
2003, Abdullah 2003;, Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, 1999 (Clapham, Conteh-
Morgan and Dixon-Fyle consider external factors). They maintain that the primary 
cause for the civil war was the style of leadership that was comprised of 
corruption, governmental mismanagement and economic instability. 
The latter statement is consistent with for example Zack-William's (1999) 
statement that, "The main causal factors for the current crisis and subsequent 
civil war could be traced to the corrosive effects of the personalized and 
monopolistic rule of the congress, which led to the destruction of civil society and 
democratic reliability" (143). 
Although the literature mainly espouses the notion that the civil war was 
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the result of internal forces, some authors hint at the notion that external forces 
have also played a role. For example, Clapham (2003) states, "While much 
criticism has been heaped on Sierra Leone's rulers this is not a case where state 
collapse can easily be ascribed to a simple failure of leadership ". He further 
notes that historical circumstances, such as colonialism is a contributing causal 
factor in Sierra Leone's current problems. However, he does not expound on how 
exogenous forces have contributed to the problem. 
The internal causes of the civil war are no doubt essential to our 
understanding. However, it is of importance to understand that external factors 
have tended to exacerbate the socio-economic conditions that underpinned the 
civil war. Stewart and Fitzgerald (2000) note some basic factors that lead to the 
occurrence of war, including civil wars. They contend that poverty, hunger and 
the collapse of public services are all factors. 
Nathan (2001) conveys that justice within the socio-economic sphere is no 
less important than politics in explaining the conditions that lead to civil wars. 
Nathan (2001) notes that where underdevelopment is combined with severe 
inequality, acts of violence are likely to occur as expressions of anger, frustration 
and fear. The pattern of civil disturbances in African countries in general 
suggests that the rise of violence increases as socio-economic opportunities 
decrease in a sudden and rapid way (Nathan, 2001 ). 
Currency devaluation, a product of structural adjustment, serves as an 
example of rapid socio-economic change that led to violent conflict in African 
countries (Nathan, 2001 ). When poverty and underemployment are linked to 
inequitable distribution of wealth, violence is likely to occur (Nathan, 2001 ). The 
aforementioned assertions are reflective of the socio-economic conditions in 
Sierra Leone. 
Dare (2001 ), in the article, "A Continent in Crisis," discusses the fact of 
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how IMF/World Bank efforts to promote increased liberalization through structural 
adjustment have led to civil violence in many African countries (2001 ). These 
policies have made it easier for transnational corporations to conduct business in 
African countries (Dare, 2001 ). Their emergence and dominance in African 
countries have in fact contributed to civil conflict in African countries by impeding 
and distorting internal economic development as they have acted to ensure 
uninterrupted access to resources (Dare, 2001 ). 
What Dare (2001);, Nathan (2001), and Stewart and Fitzgerald (2000) 
discuss in terms of the causes of civil conflict is related to the theory known as 
relative deprivation. Relative deprivation as discussed by Gupta (1990);, Gurr 
(1980); and Runicimen (1966), tends to lead to civil conflict. Gurr (1980), a 
leading theorist on relative deprivation, has established a model of relative 
deprivation. 
Collective political violence is a form of aggression 
Aggression results from anger which is produced from frustration 
The fundamental cause of the feelings of frustration is an imbalance between 
what one gets and what one considers one's due. 
Gurr (1980) further states that the propensity to feel frustration and its 
consequences is inherent, however frustration is dormant unless aroused by a 
strong external force. The greater the intensity of relative deprivation the more 
likely violent behavior is to occur (Gurr, 1980). 
Gurr (1980) posits that in order for aggression to become full blown, 
rebellion must be politicized if the aggression is to become political violence 
(1980). Therefore, if aggression is to become full blown political violence it is 
contingent on a number of factors or variables some of which include justification 
of war, environmental factors or external support (Gurr, 1980). 
In relating the theory of relative deprivation to Sierra Leone, the contingent 
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factor in terms of the aggression that led to the civil war can be viewed as 
external supports defined in terms of structural adjustment policies. Structural 
adjustment policies may have been the catalyst that over time contributed to civil 
war. 
Gurr (1980) also discussed rapid change theory as a contributor to civil 
war. Rapid change theory attributes civil conflict to the contingency of unusually 
rapid and unsettling changes in socio-economic conditions (Gurr, 1980). 
Frustration is likely to arise under such conditions due to disorientation and a rise 
in expectations (Gurr, 1980). 
When rapid change theory is applied to Sierra Leone, there is no evidence to 
suggest that rapid changes due to structural adjustment spurred a rise in 
expectations. Rapid economic changes due to structural adjustment such as 
devaluation of currency and other forms of expenditure reductions that 
decreased social service delivery, caused frustration and aggression due to the 
fact that services that were normally subsidized were being drastically cut. In 
essence, SAPs were applied in a rapid fashion that had immediate negative 
impacts on Sierra Leoneans. Again, this can be seen in terms of the rapid losses 
in health care, education and employment. 
Another example of how relative deprivation can be applied to the Sierra 
Leonean case is when we look at how structural adjustment polices provided a 
means of elite accommodation while disallowing the majority of the population to 
benefit. The majority of the population were relatively deprived of many benefits 
as elites distributed among themselves monies acquired from the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. 
Although Runciman's (1966) study was written concerning twentieth 
century England, his ideas in terms of the causes of civil conflict can be applied 
to Sierra Leone's civil war. 
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He states: 
"If people have no reason to expect or hope for more than they can achieve, 
they will be less discontented with what they have or even grateful to hold on 
to it. But if on the other hand they have been led to see as a possible goal, 
the relative prosperity of some more fortunate community with which they can 
directly compare themselves then they will remain discontented with their lot 
until they have succeeded in catching up, "(p. 9). 
The latter quote is applicable to the Sierra Leonean case in terms of the 
discontent in Sierra Leone due to the fact that some benefited from the 
implementation of structural adjustment while others did not. Many Sierra 
Leoneans could in fact see that some benefited while the majority did not, from 
resources that were provided by the World Bank and the IMF during the 
implementation of SAPs. There was no apparent reason to believe that the 
majority should not also benefit. For example, the military saw their salaries 
decrease or disappear all together as politician elites and foreigners enjoyed the 
benefits of the wealth of the country and the monies provided by the IMF and the 
World Bank. 
The military's aggression began with the overthrow of Joseph Momoh 
when many soldiers did not receive their salaries. Other groups that aggressed 
against the government in the making of the civil conflict were from the ranks of 
disadvantaged intellectuals, students and the urban poor among others. In 
addition, groups such as the Indigenous business class increasingly saw 
foreigners reap the benefits of the wealth of the country and benefit from policies 
instituted by the IMF and the World Bank through the implementation of SAPs. 
In 1991, the year in which the civil war began, the IMF and the World Bank 
extended loans and debt rescheduling to Sierra Leone that amounted to $ 625 
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million dollars with structural adjustment conditionalities attached (Nafziger and 
Auvinen, 2004). The social services of health, education and employment were 
drastically reduced as SAPs called for more expenditure cuts in the area of social 
services. 
Structural adjustment can be seen as an indirect contingency factor in 
terms of external supports. This is due to the fact that structural adjustment 
policies whether they intend to or not, did in fact lead to severe cuts in social 
expenditures that tended to cause frustration among those they impact. On the 
basis of the arguments put forth, it is reasonable to conclude that structural 
adjustment policies, that called for cuts in the most basic and essential human 
social services including health, education and employment, may have led to the 
socio-economic conditions that led to the civil war in Sierra Leone. For those who 
would oppose this conclusion I implore you to think about the following situation. 
Imagine that you are extremely poor. You live in a Third World country that 
was only recently coming out of many years of oppression under colonial 
dictatorship. Your country is considered to be amongst the poorest countries on 
the face of the planet. Your county, that is already struggling to rebuild itself goes 
into economic decline in only two decades after becoming independent, due 
largely to forces beyond its control. Although your county is poor it makes 
provisions to provide for its population in terms of basic human services such as 
health, education, employment and even food subsidies. However, your country 
believes it needs assistance in getting on its economic feet and decides to seek 
help from the world community. The World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund decide to assist your country. However, the assistance comes with strings 
attached. The financial institution stipulates that in order for your country to 
receive assistance it must do something that will severely enhance your poverty. 
Your country must cut essential subsidies that you and your family have 
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benefited from. Your country's government must cut social expenditure such as 
in health and education. In addition, your employment or lack of employment 
gets worse due to downsizing and wage cuts. Now it has becomes extremely 
difficult if not impossible to get health care, education, employment and other 
basic necessities. You have become even more impoverished than before these 
policies came about. How would you feel? Who would you desire to hold 
accountable? How would you react? 
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